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INTRODUCTION
1

Statutes in twenty-first century America are exuberantly bounteous.
Statutes, in the broad sense of the term, "include not only the products of state
legislatures and Congress, but also ordinances, administrative regulations, and
2
even constitutions." Synoptically speaking, viewed in their relation to tort law,
3
statutes fall into two basic categories. One category comprises statutes that
"expressly or implicitly address tort law, perhaps by creating a duty or defense or
4
some particular rule of conduct." The other category consists of those statutes
that do not expressly or by implication "address tort law at all but instead make
5
rules to be enforced under the criminal law or by administrative regulation.'' In
sum, insofar as judges of tort cases are concerned, the term prescriptive statutes
6
usefully describes the first category of statutes. The term nonprescriptive

1.
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 26 (3d ed. 2001) ("More than 200,000 bills are
introduced in the 50 state legislatures each biennium, and more than 10,000 in each Congress.'');
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND 1HE POLITICAL
PROCESS 1 (3d ed. 2001) ("Legislation is all around us .... Statutes have infiltrated into traditional
common law areas and created whole bodies of law to deal with the modem welfare state and to
regulate activities of modem business.").
2. DANB. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 133, at 311 (2000).

3.
4.
5.

Id
Id.
Id
Cf id § 134, at 315 (referring to statutes that do not address tort law as nonprescriptive

6.
statutes). Professor Dobbs has identified six classes of prescriptive statutes in tort law: (1)
"[s]tatutes imposing a duty but not otherwise altering the incidents of a tort claim"; (2) "[s]tatutes
limiting a claim or
creating defenses"; (4)
creating a new claim, duty, or defense"; (3) "[s]tatutes
.
.
"[s]tatutes disclaiming tort law effects"; (5) "[i]mplied disclaimer of tort effects"; and (6)
"[p]reemptive statutes." Id § 133, at 311-14 (emphasis omitted). An example of a "[s]tatute
imposing a duty but not otherwise altering the incidents of a tort claim" would be a rule that
requires a landowner at certain swimming pools to post a lifeguard. Id at 311-12. This rule sets
forth a specific duty that did "not exist at common law but does not otherwise change the rules for
negligence, causation, defenses, and procedures." Id at 311. "Statutes creating a new claim, duty, or
defense'' can be created "[b]y express tenns or by implication" and go further than merely creating a
specific duty or cause of action not existing at common law and also formulate "a set of rules about
conduct or about adjudication." Id. at 312. An example of this type of statute is the Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §.§ 51--60 (2006), which ''creates a federal claim on behalf of railroad
workers injured on the job" and "abolishes the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed
risk." DOBBS, supra note 2, § 133, at 312 (citing 45 U.S.C. §51). "Statutes limiting a claim or
creating defenses" include automobile guest statutes, '"Good Samaritan' statutes, [which] relieve
medical doctors and sometimes others of the ordinary care standard when they give treatment in
various emergency situations, and recreational use statutes[, which] relieve landowners of ordinary
care standards towards recreational users of the land." !d. n.6. Examples of "[s]tatutes disclaiming
tort law effects" include statutory provisions like the federal Occupation~ Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). Id. at 313 (citing 29 U.S.C~ §§ 651--678). OSHA states that the statute should not be
''construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law.'' 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). The category
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statutes sensibly describes the second category of statutes because "[a]lthough
such statutes prescribe no tort-law effects at all, courts are usually free
nonetheless to adopt the standards or rules of conduct from such statutes and to
7
apply them to tort cases."
This Article bypasses prescriptive statutes of tort law and focuses
exclusively on nonprescriptive statutes. My thesis is as follows: The mainstream
jurisprudential approach of finding or rejecting automatic proof of "negligence
on the part of the violator [of a nonFrescriptive statute], subject to a limited
range of excuses or to none at all" is unsystematic, vague, muddled, and
wrongheaded. Instead of using touchstones of legislative intent whether the
legislature intended to protect against the type of risk or harm that actually
occurred and whether the legislature intended to protect the class of persons
(including the plaintiff}-subject to considering various categories of excused
and unexcused statutory violations, courts should engage in unabashed judicial
policy analysis. The judicial policy analysis should consist of the pragmatics of
recognizing violation of a nonprescriptive statute as a shortcut for the proof of
the common law standard of reasonable care under the circumstances, with a
baseline bias against using the nonprescriptive violation to alter the rules of the
tort of negligence.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts that flesh out the
9
trouble with the negligence per se doctrine and its analysis in American courts.
First, in Part II, this Article explores the shaky and confusing intellectual
foundations of the negligence per se doctrine during the mid-nineteenth century
up to 1920 the eve of Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion for the New York
10
Court of Appeals_in Martin v. Herzog. Second, in Part III, this Article analyzes
Martin v. Herzog and judicial opinions decided in its wake, with a focus on
recent cases decided since 2000 to show the state of modem confusion about the
meaning of nonprescriptive statutory standards in tort. Finally, in Part IV, this

"[i]mplied disclaimer of tort effects" includes statutes that can be construed as "implicitly excluding
any tort-law effects'' because they "provide[] one remedy, such as a criminal sanction or an
administrative remedy, but say[] nothing about tort remedies'' and are a radical departure from
common law torts~ DOBBS, supra note 2, § 133, at 313. An example is a statute that require.s a
person to report suspected child abuse. /d. at 313-14 (citing Freehauf v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole
County, 623 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), appeal dismissed~ 629 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
1993); Cechman v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)). "Preemptive statutes" are a
"special case of statutes" whereby a "federal statute . . . set[s] rules of conduct and create[s] a
federal remedy, administrative or otherwise, and at the same time preempt[s] ot exclude[s] ordinary
state tort law,'' such as federal warning requirements for tobacco manufacturers. Id at 314.
7. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 134, at 315.
8. Id § 135, at 319.
9. While some courts use the term prima facie evidence of negligence instead of negligence
per se, th~ difference is insignificant. See id. § 134, at 316 ("Although it is possible that a rule
described in tenns of prima facie or presumptive negligence is a slight variant on the per se rule, the
differences, if any, are minor indeed.").
10. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
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Article attempts to clear away the cobwebs of negligence per se methodology in
nonprescriptive statutory standard cases. In this key part, I argue that the theory
of law in such cases should shift from the inappropriate and confusing basis of
11
legislative intent to the proper and illuminating basis of judicial policy analysis.

11. It is surprising that only a few legal scholars in a smattering of articles have touched on
the efficacy of the negligence per se doctrine. See, e.g., Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se
Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REv. 51, 89-90 (2005)
(discussing the problems involved in applying negligence per se to medical device litigation);
Margaret Fordham, Breach of Statutory Duty-A Diminishing Tort, 1996 SING. J. LEGAL STUD.
362, 363, 373-74 (considering the tendency of courts to increasingly deny claims for breach of
statutory duty); Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se:
What's the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 497-500 (1998) (discussing how statutes relate to tort
cases in Oregon); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns ofNegligence,
53 LA. L. REv.
..
1509, 1518-19 (1993) (discussing the different methods courts use in analyzing negligence per se);
Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era ofPrivatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569,
631-32 (2001) (exploring the idea of negligence per se in a welfare context); David Howarth,
Muddying the Waters: Tort Law and the Environment from an English Perspective, 41 WASHBURN
L.J. 469, 491 (2002) (noting that English courts do not recognize the doctrine of negligence per se);
Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 37880 (2002) (considering negligence per se within the "hann-within-the-risk" analysis); Alexandra B.
Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 N01RE
DAME L. REV. 699, 742-45 (2006) (discussing the use of statutory standards to inform public trust
principles); John E~ Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Misuse of Precedent, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 145, 165-69 (1987) (discussing implied rights of action); Paul Sherman, Use of
Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITTIER L. REv. 831, 877-908 (1992)
(describing the increase in federal statutes and the effect of that increase on negligence per se
actions); Mike Steenson, The Impact of "Exceptional'' Statutes on Civil Litigation in Minnesota, 26
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 865, 866-79 (2000) (discussing "exceptional" statutes in Minnesota and
their impact on negligence per se); Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative
Standards: Texas's Solution to the Problem ofNegligence PerSe?, 49 BAYLORL. REV. 109 passim
(1997) (discussing the history of negligence per se and its overlooked issues); Nancy G. Itnyre,
Comment, Civil Liability for Violations of Criminal Statutes, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 681,714716 (1998) (discussing the imposition of civil liability for the violation of a criminal statute);
Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for Victims of
Identity Theft: Someone Stole my Identity, Now Who is Going to Pay for it?, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 847,
865-66 (2005) (proposing negligence per se actions as a possible recourse for identity theft
victims). Older articles examining the negligence per se doctrine are sparse. See, e.g., Fleming
James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95 passim (1950-1951) (discussing negligence pet se in the context of accidents); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil
Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 361 (1932) (analyzing the issues
arising from the determination that criminal statutes "entail certain civil consequences as well'');
Clarence Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 passim
(1933) (arguing that not every violation of a criminal statute should constitute negligence per se);
Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 2734 (1949) (explaining how a finding of a violation of a criminal statute is conclusively a breach of
duty). No scholar to date has exhaustively examined, on an in-depth basis, the origins and legal
theory of negligence per se.
.
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II. THE WEAK FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE PER SE DOCTRINE
A.

The Problem with Nonprescriptive Statutes and Tort Law

Many statutes, ordinances, and administrative regulations, which can be
12
generically referred to as statutes, "prescribe no tort law effects at all." For
example, "[a] highway speed limit statute usually prescribes a criminal penalty,
13
but as to tort liability it prescribes nothing.;' Thomas Cooley, in his late
nineteenth century treatise on tort law, identified the following problem with
nonprescriptive statutes: "Where the statute imposes a new duty, where none
existed before, and gives a specific remedy for its violation, the presumption is
that this remedy was meant to be exclusive, and the party complaining of a
14
breach is confined to it."
However, as Professor Dan Dobbs has pointed out, "courts [have come to]
say that violation of such a statute automatically proves negligence on the
of
1
the violator, subject only to a limited range of excuses or to none at all." How
did the American judiciary arrive at this counterintuitive rule? What follows in
this part of the Article is an attempt to sketch an intellectual history of
negligence per se that draws chiefly upon published judicial opinions but also
considers scholarly input.

vart

B. Early Judicial Opinions, 1841-1879

The first American judicial reference to the phrase "negligence per se"
6
appeared in Simpson v. Hand/ an 1841 opinion of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. This case involved two ships on the Delaware River; the owners
of an anchored schooner, the Thorn, sought damages against the owners of the
17
brig; the William Henry, stemming from a nighttime collision. In commenting
on the conflicting trial testimony on the issue of whether or not the Thorn had a
signal lantern to warn the approaching vessel, the William Henry, Chief Justice
Gibson included the following colorful dictum in his opinion:
Indeed, the hoisting of a light is a precaution so imperiously demanded
by prudence, that I know not how the omission of it could be qualified
by circumstances, any more than could the leaving of a crate of china in

12. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 318.
13. Id
14. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 783 (2d ed. 1888).
15. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 318-19.
16. 6 Whart. 311, 323 (Pa. 1841).
17. I d. at 311.

LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
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the track of a railroad car; or how it could be considered otherwise than
18
.
as neg11gence per se.
So negligence per se parlance began with a maritime case that did not
mention a statute but rather a nautical custom that demanded, in the court's view,
19
the anchored vessel to have a warning light as a matter of law. Failure to abide
by the custom meant that the Thorn's ';people were obnoxious to such a charge
2
of negligence as would bar the action."
The next judicial reference to negligence per se parlance occurred ten years
later, in 1851, in another nighttime ship collision case off the coast of the new
1
state of California? The Supreme Court of California, in Innis v. Steamer
22
Senator, parroted the exact dicta from Simpson the seminal Pennsylvania
23
case. Interestingly enough, also in 1851, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
24
distinguished the facts in its case, Sparks v. Steamer Saladin, which involved a
collision between a steamboat on the Mississippi River with a moored flatboat
25
on a foggy night, from the facts in Simpson. Plaintiff, a flatboat owner, sued the
26
steamboat for negligence. On appeal, counsel for the defendants cited the
7
negligence per se dicta from Simpson? According to Justice Slidell of the
28
Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, the ''context and the facts'' involving
the Mississippi River collision were different from the context of the
Pennsylvania maritime collision:
The present case is a very different one. Here was a flatboat tied to
the bank at a place appropriated to that sort of craft, at a considerable
distance from the landing appropriated to steamboats; there was no want
of conformity to custom, whereby a false confidence could be given to
an approaching vessel; nor does there appear to have been any reason
for the owner of the flatboat to expect that a steamboat would come to
29
that part of the bank of the river.
So the first three published judicial decisions that used negligence per se
parlance were common law maritime vessel collision cases that considered the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

!d. at 323.
Id. at 323-24.
ld. at 324.
Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 459-60 (1851).
1 Cal. 459 (1851).
Id at 460-61 (quoting Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323-24).
6 La. Ann. 764 (1851).
!d. at 764-65 (citing Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323).
Id. at 764.
I d. (citing Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323).
!d. at 765.
!d.
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context and custom of moored vessels deploying warning lights at night. While
the Pennsylvania and the California cases involved clear-cut local customs for a
moored vessel to use warning lights triggering judicial conclusions that, as a
matter of law, failure to have lights constituted negligent conduct the Louisiana
case involved different facts and circumstances such that the court was unwilling
to conclude that a failure to have warning lights on the stationary vessel at night
30
was negligence as a matter of law. But none of these early negligence per se
31
cases involved statutes.
·
The first judicial considerations of the effect of statutory enactments
regarding the duty of due care were a pair of railroad cases decided in 1854: a
32
New York trial court opinion, Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester Rail Road Co.,
and a Supreme Court of Vermont opinion, Morse v. Rutland & Burlington
33
Railroad Co.
In Langlois, a New York trial court noted the existence of a state statute that
obligated railroads '~o erect and maintain fences" on the sides of their tracks; if a
railroad failed to erect these fences, the statute created liabilizy "'for all
34
damages'" caused by the train "'to cattle, horses or animals thereon."' The case
at bar involved a railroad employee who died from injuries sustained when a
35
train engine and attached coal tender were overturned by straying cattle. Justice
T.R. Strong concluded that the statute did not impose a duty on the railroad to
36
prevent human death or injury. He phrased the question, to which he answered
in the negative, in the following manner:
It is undoubtedly true that fences along our lines or rail roads,
protecting the tracks from cattle on adjoining lands, are an important
measure of security, both to the agents and servants of rail road
corporations, and to the public; but in the absence of a legislative
provision making their erection an absolute duty to the public, can the

30. Compare Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 459~0 (1851) ("[T]he Court should have
instructed the jury that want of a light and a watch, in the position of the Rhode Island, was such
negligence on her part, as to prevent a recovery.''), and Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323-24 e'[T]he
hoisting of a light is a precaution so imperiously demanded by prudence, that I know not how the
omission of it could be qualified by circumstances ... or how it could be considered otherwise than
as negligence per se.''), with Sparks, 6 La. Ann. at 765 (holding that the case was "a very different
one" from Simpson and refusing to fmd negligence per se).
31. See Innis, 1 Cal. 459; Sparks, 6 La. Ann. 764; Simpson, 6 Whart. 311.
32. 19 Barb. 364 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1854).
33. 27 Vt. 49 (1854).
34. 19 Barb. at 369 (quoting 1850 N.Y. Laws 233).
35. Id. at 365-66.
36. See id. at 369.

228

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:

221

courts properly impose it as a duty, and hold its non-performance, per
37
se, negligence, disregarding all other circumstances?
While the trial court judge in Langlois did not directly say so, it appears that
the motivation for his decision not to create negligence per se liability for
wrongful death was the lack of a proper fit between the claimed injury with the
class of persons protected by the New York statute animal owners and and
38
the type of injury contemplated by the statute damage or death ofanimals.
The Supreme Court of Vermont's opinion in Morse involved an analysis of a
39
Vermont railroad fencing statute. The court construed the statute narrowly such
that there was no duty to the plaintiff (whose cattle initially strayed from the
owner's land onto a neighbor's lot that adjoined the railroad tracks and then
ultimately strayed onto the tracks) because a duty was owed only to the
40
landowner whose land abutted the railroad. The court also concluded that the
speed of the locomotive was not negligence per se and that the common law
41
standard of ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances was warranted.
In 1866, the Court of Appeals of New York applied a negligence per se
42
analysis in Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Co., making it the first case in
which an American appellate court found a defendant negligent for violating a
statute. In reversing a nonsuit for a wrongful death action involving a teamster
driving a two-horse sleigh across train tracks, the court had the occasion to
expound on the significance of the railroad's failure to sound its whistle and ring
43
its bell in violation of a New York statute. Judge Porter held:
This was an act in open defiance of a public statute, enacted for the
protection of the traveler. It was a flagrant breach of duty to the
passengers, whose safety it jeopardized, to the stockholders, whose
property it imperiled, and to the testator, whose life it exposed. Its direct
tendency was to put him off his guard, to disarm his vigilance, and to
produce a false sense of security.... It is not the policy of the law to
favor those who deliberately violate its mandates, nor is it the duty of
the courts to invent excuses for wrong-doers, or to palliate the guilt of
reckless homicide. Our statutes for the protection of life are to be
obeyed; and when they are broken and defied, responsibility is not to be

37. Id at 370.
38. See id at 369-70.
39. Morse v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 49, 52 (1854) (citing Vt. Comp. Stat. ch.
26, § 41 (1849)).
40. Id. at 53-54 (citing Jackson v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 150, 161 (1853)).
41. Id at 54.
42. 35 N.Y. 9 (1866).
43. !d. at 22, 28-29.
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invaded by imputing blame, without proof, to him who suffers death, for
44
the sake of shielding those who inflict it.
The court's opinion in Ernst is fraught with emotional condemnation of the
45
locomotive crew who failed to follow the whistle and bell statute.
Two years later, in the 1869 case St. Louis, Jacksonville & Chicago Railroad
46
Co. v. Terhune, the Supreme Court of Illinois utilized negligence per se
concepts to uphold a railroad's liability in another whistle and bell statutory
47
violation case this time, for the destruction of two cows by a locomotive.
48
An 1875 federal trial court opinion, Adams v. West Roxbury, involved a
workplace personal injury action by an employee of a street repair crew who was
49
seriously injured by explosives that went off accidentally. The court seemed to
hint at what became in later years strict liability for abnormally dangerous
50
activities when it asked in passing if "[t]he use of exploders in blasting, not
being ... negligence per se, and the town having procured exploders ... [which]
were generally deemed to be a good safe article ... , what higher degree of care
51
could be required of the master?'' The court went on, however, to reject a strict

44. Id at 28-29. Curiously, in Ernst, the Court of Appeals of New York made no reference to
its decision just six years prior in Brown v. Buffalo & State Line Railroad Co., 22 N.Y. 191 (1860).
That case, as described by Professor Dobbs, "reject[ed] the idea that a criminal statute would have
tort law effect.'' DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 319 n.2 (citing Brown, 22 N.Y. 191). Perhaps the
fact that the plaintiff in Ernst was the widow of a hapless teamster affected the court's view of the
tort law effect of the violation by the railroad of a quasi-criminal statute.
45. See Ernst, 35 N.Y. at 28-29. The Court of Appeals of New York utilized negligence per
se parlance in another 1866 train accident case, Willis v. Long Island Railroad Co., 34 N.Y. 670,
675-76 (1866). However, like the maritime cases discussed above, see supra notes 16-31 and
accompanying text, the negligence per se language was not used to describe the breach of a
statutory standard but rather to refer to conduct that was claimed to be clearly uncareful. Willis, 34
N.Y. at 675-76. Other courts used similar negligence per se language in early railroad cases. See,
e.g., Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ill. 497, 500 (1868) ("In that case, as in this, it was
contended, that it was negligence per se to permit dry weeds and grass to accumulate on the right of
way of a railway company; that its presence there created a legal presumption of negligence.'');
Pittsburg & Connellsville R~R. Co. y. McClurg, 56 Pa. 294, 300 (1867) ("In conclusion, we have
simply to reassert, that where a traveller puts his elbow or an ann out of a car window, voluntarily,
without any qualifying circll11lstances impelling him to it, it must be regarded as negligence in se;
and when that is the state of the evidence it is the duty of the court to declare the act negligence in
law."). For similar, nonstatutory use of negligence per se language in an early case involving an
owner of a mule killed by the bad repair of a canal towpath, see Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Bentley,
66 Pa. 30, 33 (1870).
46. 50 Ill. 151 (1869).
47. Id at 153-54.
48. 1 F. Cas. 152 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 67).
49. Id. at 152-53.
50. For an explanation of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, see
RESTA1EI\1ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519-520 (1976).
51. Adams, 1 F. Cas. at 154.
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liability theory, shifting back to ordinary negligence principles in the following
excerpt:
If a master should procure a box of percussion caps from a well
known respectable manufacturer, which were by the community at
large, generally considered safe and free from danger, would it be
expected of him that he should use up a large portion of the contents of
the box in testing them before he put them in the hands of his servants
for use? Could he not well rely on the standing and reputation of the
maker of the article for his putting on the market a safe and proper cap,
and if on careful inspection they were apparently all right, and no defect
could be discoverable, should he be deemed guilty of negligence, if
52
under such circumstances he procured and used them in his business?

C. The Run Up to Cardozo's Opinion in Martin v. Herzog, 1880-1920
During the forty-one year period of 1880 through 1920, there was an
explosion of judici~l. reference~ ~o the. phrase "neBligence per se," wit~ 3,419
5
state and federal optntons contatntng thts language. The cases are a galltmaufry
of holdings and dicta. Some cases do not address statutes or ordinances on civil
liability at all but rather utilize ''negligence per se" to consider whether conduct
4
of litigants could be construed as lacking due care as a matter of law. 5 Other

52. Id. at 155.
53. Based on a Westlaw search of the phrase "negligence per se" in the "all cases" database
with a query of dates between 1879 and 1921 (search conducted on Oct. 31, 2009).
54. See, e.g., Mammoth Vein Coal Co. v. Johnson, 127 S.W. 971, 971 (Ark. 1910) (citing
Johnson v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 114 S.W. 722, 729 (Ark. 1908)) (deciding that it is not
negligent as a matter of law for a coal miner to continue working in a dangerous part of the mine);
Meeks v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 56 Cal. 513; 517 (1880) (citing Meeks v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 CaL 602,
604-05 (1878)) (hearing an appeal of a plaintiff who fell asleep on train tracks); Girtman Bros. v.
Eaton, 59 So. 397, 399 (Fla. 1912) ("It is not negligence per se for an iron rod in a wagon to
protrude from the wagon as it passes along a street.''); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Simons,
79 N .E. 911, 915 (Ind. 1907) (holding that it is not negligent as a matter of law for a railroad to
leave its switches unblocked); Middleton v. City of Cedar Falls, 153 N.W. 1040, 1046 (Iowa 1915)
("It is not negligence per se for a person to pass over a street or sidewalk in the nighttime."); Wolf
v. Des Moines Elevator Co., 98 N.W. 301, 302 (Iowa 1904) (explaining that it is not negligent as a
matter of law to establish a "factory, shop, or other industrial plant" near a public thoroughfare);
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 22 P. 995, 1000 (Kan. 1890) (''The plaintiff is not precluded
from recovery because on approaching the railroad crossing he did not stop.''); Kelly v. S. Minn. R.
Co., 9 N.W. 588, 590 (Minn. 1881), overruled on other grounds by Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L.
Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883) ("In the present case a court would have no right to hold
that it was negligence per se to attempt to drive over this [railroad] crossing with knowledge of the
fact of the removal of [a] plank. That was eminently a proper question for .. . the jury ...."); Smith
v. Mo. Pac~ Ry. Co., 20 S.W~ 896, 898 (Mo. 1892) (stating that it is not negligent as a matter of law
for a railroad to have three freight trains converge on a single station at the same time); Hendricks v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 35 S.E. 543, 546 (N.C. 1900) (indicating that it is not negligence per se for a
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cases decided during this time frame use negligence per se terminology to
describe what has come to be called a rule of law a judicial determination that
5
specified conduct automatically breaches a standard of reasonable care. 5 Still
other cas.es lacking statutory referents utilize ''negligence p.e r se'' as a rhetorical
56
.
trope.
Numerous judicial opinions during the 1880-1920 period refer, in a
perfunctory and mechanical way, to the proposition that the violation of a statute
or municipal ordinance is or is not negligence per se or mere evidence of
7
negligence in a civil action seeking compensatory damages. 5
Only a handful of judicial opinions during this approximately four decade
time frame attempted to explain the rationale for grafting a nonprescriptive
statutory standard onto a civil action for the tort of negligence. Surprisingly, the
rather o?scure Supre~e Court of the Territo~ ofN~w . Mexico, in the 1~97 case
of Cerrzllos Coal Ra1lroad Co. v. Deserant, provided what may be viewed as
the first quasi-scholarly American judicial opinion to explore the emerging
doctrine of negligence per se. Cerrillos was a wrongful death action by the

telephone company to fail to promptly notify the sender that a message could not be delivered);
Palmer v. Willamette ValleyS. Ry. Co., 171 P. 1169, 1172 (Or~ 1918) (noting a split of authority on
whether it is negligent as a matter of law for a passenger to board a moving train); Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Cusenberry, 26 S.W. 43, 46 (Tex. 1894) ("It is not negligence. per se for a railroad
company to permit grass and weeds, or other combustible matter, to accumulate upon its right of
way.'' (citing Gram v. N. Pac. R. Co.; 46 N.W. 972, 975 (N.D.1890))).
55. See, e.g., Gothard v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 67 Ala. 114, 116-17 (18:80) (stating the duty
of a wagon driver to look and listen for approaching trains before crossing tracks); Plummer v. E.
R.R. Co., 73 Me. 591, 593 (1882) (quoting Grows v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 67 Me. 100, 104 (1877))
(stating the duty to look for approaching
trains).
.
.
.
56. See, e.g., Jordan v. McNeil, 25 Kan. 459, 461 (1881) ("Is it, as an abstract question of
law, negligence per se for a client to rely upon the professional integrity of a Kansas lawyer?").
57. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Golden, 21 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1894)
(considering railroad's failure to signal warnings to persons not near a crossing); Lake Shore & M.
S. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 76 N.E. 629, 630-31 (Ind. 1906) (finding that the. running of a train over a
country highway crossing at fifty miles per hour is not negligence per se); Chesapeake Beach Ry.
Co. v. Donahue, 68 A. 507,509 (Md. 1908) (holding that trepassing deliberately on railroad tracks
.constitutes negligence per se); Babel v. Manning, 70 N.W. 327, 330 (Mich. 1897) (holding that
violating a gun safety statute is negligence per se); Bowman v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 85 Mo. 533,
538 (1885) (citing Kelley v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 75 Mo. 138, 142 (1881); Karle v.
Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. Co., 55 Mo. 476, 483 (1874)) (analyzing the
violation of a train speeding ordinance); Morrison v. Lee, 133 N.W. 548, 550 (N.D. 1911) (stating
that the violation of a statute constituting negligence per se did "not abrogate the defense of
contributory negligence'' without a legislative intent to do so); Crowl v. W. Coast Steel Co., 186 P.
866, 870 (Wash. 1920) (explaining that violation of a pedestrian crossing ordinance is negligence
per se); O'Brien v. Wash. Water Power Co., 129 P. 391, 394 (Wash. 1913) (citing Wilson v. Puget
Sound Elec.. Ry. Co., 101 P .. 50, 54 (Wash. 1909); Engelker v. Seattle Elec. Co., 96 P .. 1039, 103940 (Wash. 1908)) (operating a street car at a_rate of speed in excess of that permitted by ordinance is
negligence per se).
58. 49 P. 807 (N.M. 1897), overruled on other grounds by Stang v. Hertz Corp., 467 P.2d 14,
18 (N.M. 1970).

232

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61: 221

survivors _of~ coal miner who d~ed ~along_ with t':enty-tw~ other miners) from
5
an explosion 1n a room of the mtne. Justtce Collter descrtbed the 1891 Act of
Congress that was at issue in the case:
The act . . . provides that managers or owners of coal mines shall
provide adequate ventilation of not less than so many cubic feet of air
per minute for so many men, and ... force same through the mine ... to
dilute and render harmless noxious and poisonous gases, and to keep all
60
working places clear of standing gas.
Initially, the territorial court noted that "[i]t has been laid down in a recent work
61
of high authority that a breach of a statutory duty is negligence per se.'' But
then the Cerrillos opinion observed: "Such, however, does not seem to be the
62
view of the United States [S]upreme [C]ourt'' In support of this proposition,
the territorial court cited four previous Supreme Court railroad opinions as
authority for making "[b]reaches of statute or ordinance'' mere evidence of
63
negligence. Applying the mere evidence of negligence standard that it derived

59. Id at 807.
60. Id at 812. The federal statute at bar was simply cited as an "act of congress passed March
3, 1891." /d. The statute referred to by the court is probably Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 564, 26 Stat.
1104.
61. Cerrillos, 49 P. at 812 (citing 3 BYRON K. ELLIOT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOT, A TREATISE
ONTHELAWOFEVIDENCE § 1155 (18_97)).
62. /d.
63. /d. (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 282-83 (1894); Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 418 (1892); Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., Ill U.S. 228, 239-40
(1884); Randall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 478, 485 (1883)). Interestingly, the frrst opinion
by the Supreme Court of the United States to use negligence per se parlance explicitly was Grand
Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives. See 144 U.S. at 418. Ives involved a wrongful death action by survivors
of a Michigan fanner who was struck by a train while crossing a railroad track in his horse-drawn
buggy. !d. at 409-11. lves was brought in a Michigan state court and removed to federal court on
the basis of diversity of citizenship. /d. at 409. A Detroit city ordinance set a train speed limit of six
miles per hour~ Id at 411. The Supreme Court began its analysis of the applicability of the
ordinance by discussing the "reasonable and prudent'' standard of care in a negligence suit. Id at
417. The Court went on to observe: ''Indeed, it has been held in many cases that the running of
railroad trains within the limits of a city at a rate of speed greater than is allowed by an ordinance of
such city is negligence, per se." Id at 418 (citing Schlereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 509, 515
(1888); Va. Mid. R.R. Co. v. White, 84 Va. 498, 502 (1888)}. Without further explanation,
however, the Court concluded: "But, perhaps, the better and more generally accepted rule is that
such an act . . . is always to be considered by the jury as at least a circumstance from which
negligence may be inferred in detennining whether the company was or was not guilty of
negligence." /d. (citing five different state cases to support its conclusion).. The lves Court did not
provide any comparison to the question of violation of a state statute; however, later in its opinion,
the Court construed a statute delegating authority to a railroad commissioner in deciding whether a
flagman should be posted at a railroad crossing. Id at 421-22. In the situation where the
commissioner had decided not to require a flagman at the crossing at bar, the Court construed the
statute as giving rise to the following construction: "[A] railroad company, under certain
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from previous Supreme Court precedent, the Cerrillos court reasoned, in rather
opaque language, as follows:
Where the means to be adopted for securing requisite ventilation were
not prescribed [in the 1891 Act], but congress contented itself with
general directions, it should be held that reasonable effort is to be
exerted to attain and maintain this result. If this result were neither
attained nor maintained, it would then be the jury's province to say
whether, under all the circumstances, this failure was or not due to
64
negligence by the defendant
While the Cerrillos opinion questioned the negligence per se doctrine
utilized by other courts and a treatise writer, the basis of the skepticism was
sketchy, unexamined dicta from United States Supreme Court precedent. But, at
least the Cerrillos court made a persuasive albeit somewhat turgid logical
argument that a statute that set forth a general standard as opposed to a specific
standard should do no more than assist the jury to assess the context of care
that ultimately should govern the case. The general standard, according to this
line of reasoning, should not sidetrack the trier of fact in making its own
independent judgment based on all of the evidence adduced at trial in
determining whether the defendant's conduct fell below a standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances.
65
In Southern Railway Co. v. Bryan, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in a
thoughtful but flawed 1899 opinion authored for the court by Justice
Haralson, offered a searching and analytical account of the negligence per se
66
doctrine. Bryan was a wrongful death action brought by a deceased railroad
engineer's wife; the engineer died in a nighttime collision with another train that
67
was not sufficiently lit. An Alabama penal statute (first enacted in 1867 and
amended twice) established a twofold duty on railroad officers operating trains
68
within the state. As paraphrased by Justice Haralson, these legislative
prescriptions required that a train come to a full stop within 100 feet of a place of
crossing of two tracks and that a stopped train '"not proceed until [the ·engineer
and conductor] know the way to be clear,"' with a criminal fine, imprisonment,
.

.

.

circumstances, will not be held free from negligence, even though it may have complied literally
with the terms of a statute prescribing certain signals to be given, and other precautions ...." Id at
420--21. According to the Court, the rationale for this rule of construction is that "other measures,"
not specified in the statute, may be dictated by "public safety and common prudence'' under the
circumstances of the case. Id at 421 (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Perkins, 125 Ill.
127, 131 (1888)).
64. Cerrillos, 49 P. at 812.
65. 28 So. 445 (Ala. 1899).
66. Id at 449.
67. I d. at 445-46.
68. /d. at 447 (citing 1898 Ala. Laws 44).
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or "hard labor for the county" as possible penalties for violation. The issue on
appeal was whether the trial court properly considered negligence per se where
there was evidence that the decedent engineer failed to take appropriate
70
precautions before crossing the track intersection. As explained by the court,
''[e]ach train may reasonably indulge the presumption, that the other will comply
with the mandates of the statute, but this presumption will not protect either from
liability for want of care in proceeding, when it becomes apparent, or reasonably
71
so, that the other train is negligent and disobedient." The heart of the Alabama
opinion focused on interpreting the meaning of the state statute's command that
train officials, stopped at a track crossroads, "'must not proceed until they know
72
the way to be clear. '" In a detailed consideration of this legal problem, Justice
Haralson opined for the court:
Can the knowledge required to be had by the engineer and conductor,
that the way is clear, mean less, than that they shall take such steps as
are necessary to inform and make themselves certain, and not be
doubtful of the fact? If one upon whom such a duty is imposed, takes the
necessary steps to thus make himself aware of the situation at or about
the crossing, and uses all diligence necessary to that end, and there is an
absence of another train, so far as the diligent exercise of his senses will
discover, with which he may collide, this would be knowledge on his
part, such as the law requires. But, to acquire such knowledge, he must
exhaust all necessary means to make himself certain; or, in other words,
he must exercise not simply ordinary, but the highest degree of diligence
to ascertain that the way is clear. This knowledge may not imply,
however, that the way will certainly remain clear against all afteroccurring,
extraordinary,
unanticipated
and
unascertainable
73
happenings.
At this juncture in the opinion, the Supreme Court of Alabama tried to
discern the elusive intent of the state legislature in passing a penal statute that did
not explicitly provide that the penal standard of care should be transposed to a
civil tort action predicated on negligence:
This statute is not merely declaratory of the common law. Without
it, the duty of an engineer would require him to use reasonable, or
ordinary care to avoid collision, to stop if necessary, and not proceed

69. Id at 447-48.
70. Id. at 448.
71. Id at 447.
72. I d. at 448.
73. !d. at 448-49.
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until, by reasonable diligence, he ascertains that he may do so safely. If
nothing more than ordinary care is required under the statute, it would
seem, it may as well, for the ends proposed, have not been adopted. The
legislature evidently did not deem such degree of care sufficient in such
an emergency, where the danger to life and property is so great; and the
statutes were passed, manifestly, to impose a higher degree of diligence
than was theretofore required, extraordinary care on the part of those
running trains to prevent collisions such as that with which we deal. The
officers upon whom the duties imposed by the statute are devolved,
cannot neglect their discharge, without committing a Renal offense, and
74
rendering their company liable for consequent injuries.
While the court's analysis regarding legislative intent was a respectable
attempt to unpack the meaning of the specific penal command, the reasoning was
deficient in several respects. First, the opinion did not grapple with the question
of whether the common law duty of reasonable care, applicable to tort actions for
compensatory damages, should be displaced by a criminal standard of
extraordinary care. Second, the court failed to explain how the assumed
legislatively-posited duty of extraordinary care could ever be successfully met by
a person like the decedent engineer, who could not perceive the other train
(operating without lights) in the darkness of night. Third, without saying so, the
opinion turns on its head the usual lenity the law of torts accords to individuals
behaving under emergency conditions to a virtual strict liability standard of care.
Fourth, the court contradicted itself by, on the one hand, quoting a learned
treatise by Elliott that ~''ordinarily the omission of the statutory duty is
negligence per se, and that where the omission is established, such negligence
75
arises as a matter of law, ''' and then, on the other hand, going on to conclude
that "by the very terms of the statute," the engineer was "forbidden absolutely to
cross the tracks, until [he] knew the way to be clear for [his train] to pass in
safety," when he could never know with certitude under the circumstances that it
76
was all clear. Finally, the opinion made the erroneous conclusion that the
court's hands were tied: "If we preserve the integrity of the statute, we see no
77
escape from the conclusion we reach." To the contrary, because the statute was
a nonprescriptive penal statute (theoretically applicable only in a criminal
prosecution), the Alabama court had judicial discretion to find the statute
inapplicable to a wrongful death action sounding in negligence.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 449.
I d. (emphasis added) (quoting ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 61, § 1155, at 1745).
I d. at 449-50.
!d. at 450.
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The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in the 1905 case of Borneman v.
78
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, issued a
commendable summary of differing judicial interpretations of ordinances or
79
statutes in American courts. Borneman involved an action in negligence
against a railroad for the plaintiffs loss of a horse that was killed at a railroad
80
crossing. The plaintiff alleged that the railroad violated a city ordinance setting
forth a speed limit and a requirement that a ''bell ... be rung continually on all
81
engines while running within the city limits." The court stated the following:
Many cases lay down the rule that the violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence per se, or conclusive evidence of negligence. The
rule of other cases seems to be that the violation of a statute or
municipal ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence. In still other
cases the courts have been content with the announcement that evidence
of the fact that the defendant's act constituted the violation of a state or
municipal law is proper for the consideration of the jury in determining
82
whether the defendant was in fact negligent.
.

.

.

'

While the Borneman court's paraphrase of what the justices discerned to be
three extant judicial approaches to the construction of nonprescriptive statutory
violations in negligence cases was pithy and lucid, the court following in the
footsteps of previous judicial pronouncements on the subject failed to
articulate any rationale for choosing from among the three approaches other than
83
the authority of precedent. Indeed, like earlier opinions, the jurists did not
address the essential legal question of why a penal statutory enactment that djd
not address civil actions in tort should be used at all in a common law negligence
cause of action.
The Su reme Court of Utah, in the 1907 case Smith v. Mine & Smelter
probing the rationale behind the use of nonprescriptive statutes and ordinances in
negligence cases. Mrs. Smith sued for damages to her home and destruction of
85
personal property caused by the negligence of a mining company. The mining
company had violated a Salt Lake City ordinance prescribing how explosives
should be stored in magazines and vaults, and prohibiting the storage of '"any

78. 104 N.W. 208 (S.D. 1905).
79. ld at 211 (citing Archibald R. Watson, Negligence, in 21 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 478-79 (DavidS. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1902)).
80. Id at 209.
81. Id at 211.
82. Id. (citing Watson, supra note 79, at 478-79).
83. See id
84. 88 P. 683 (Utah 1907).
85. !d. at 683.
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explosive substance having an explosive power greater than that of ordinary
86
gunpowder. "' Initially, the court contended that "whether a violation of a
[statute] or ordinance constitutes negligence per se depends in a large measure
87
upon the nature of the law or ordinance." Thus, as noted by the court, "[w]hen
a standard of duty or care is fixed by law or ordinance, and such law or
ordinance has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as a matter
88
of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence."
Reasoning that it would make no sense to allow people who violated a safety
standard contained in a statute or ordinance to argue that they conformed to the
common law negligence standard of ordinary care and prudence, the Smith court
opined:
In any case the standard is usually defined as that degree of care that
men of ordinary care and prudence usually exercise. But, when the
standard is fixed by law or ordinance, how can one be heard to say that
he exercised care in exceeding, or in refraining to comply with, the
standard fixed? There is, in such cases, no comparison to be made. Care
and prudence alone cannot excuse. Exceeding or disregarding the
standard of care imposed must be held to be negligence, if it is anything.
If it is held not to be such per se, it simply amounts to this: That it is for
the jury to say whether, in violating a law or ordinance fixing a standard
of care to be observed the law was carefully or negligently violated. The
violation, thus in and of itself, would mean nothing, and one would be
permitted to violate the law with impunity, provided the jury find it to
89
have been carefully done.
The court's rationale, however, was deficient. It would certainly matter for
purposes of criminal liability and penal policy whether or not a defendant
violated the explosives ordinance. However, it might not make sense to hold a
defendant negligent per se for all losses occasioned by an explosion stemming
from the violation of the ordinance. The court acknowledged as much by
limiting liability for a statutory or ordinance violation to proximately caused
injuries and providing for defenses for an act of God or an unavoidable
90
accident. Moreover, the court's reasoning is further deficient because it did not
explain why the explosives ordinance was designed for the "safety of life, limb,
91
or property." Was this an inference by the court based on the subject matter of
the ordinance? Or, was it a conclusion about the intent of the Salt Lake City

86. Id
87. Id at 686.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. See id at 686-87.
91. Id. at 687.
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Council in promulgating the explosives ordinance? The court leaves it to us to
guess the answer.
92
The 1906 opinion of Schutt v. Adair by the Supreme Court of Minnesota
offered little more than a conclusory holding on whether negligence per se
existed for violation of a statutory standard. In Schutt, a man fell down an open
elevator shaft when he was on defendant's premises for the purpose of
93
transacting business. The court explained that a state statute provided that
"elevator shafts like those involved in this case [are] to be guarded and
protected,'' but the court was "not prepared to admit that the statute" was
94
applicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, without any explanation to
support its conclusion, the court held that the elevator statute "was enacted for
the protection of employes in warehouses, factories, and manufacturing.
establishments, and it is doubtful whether, properly construed, it has any
95
application to others." Yet, the court went on to assume the elevator statute's
96
potential applicability to nonemployees like the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the
statute's potential applicability, the court concluded that "statutes imposing such
duties are not [to be] construed as to abrogate the ordinary [all or nothing] rules
of contributory negligence, unless so worded as to leave no doubt that the
97
Legislature intended to exclude the defense. " Therefore, according to the court,
the trial judge properly instructed the jury, and the jury reached a justifiable
98
verdict denying plaintiffs suit for negligence.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the 1909 case of Inland Steel Co. v.
99
Yedinak, upheld a jury verdict in favor of a young boy who was seriously
injured when a railroad car ran over his leg while he was working the graveyard
100
A state statute prohibited ''the employment of a child
shift at a steel mil1.
101
under 14 years of age in any manufacturing establishment within [the] state.''
The supreme court construed the child employment prohibition statute as
"designed to protect children against the hardships and perils resulting from
overexertion''; as a "legislative interdiction [that] in effect declares that children
within the prohibited age are not possessed of that judgment, discretion, and care
requisite and necessary for their· own safety while engaged in a hazardous
avocation"; and as making the steel company "chargeable with knowledge of the
legal disabilities of children to engage in its service, and [required to] ascertain at

92. 108' N.W. 811 (Minn. 1906), overruled by Suess v. Arrowhead Steel
N.W. 125, 126-27 (Minn. 1930).
93. Id at 811.
94. ld at 812 (citing MINN. STAT.§ 24.2250 (1894)).
95. Id
96. See id
97. Id
98. ld,
99. 87 N.E. 229 (Ind. 1909)~
100. Jd at 231--32, 236.
101. ld at 232 (citing IND. CODE ANN.§. 8022 (1908)).
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its peril that a boy employed in the operations of its factory, which has been
102
classified by the Legislature as dangerous, is of the required age." The court
103
characterized violation of the state statute as constituting "negligence per se";
however, the court really construed such violations of the statute as giving rise to
absolute civil liability for the boy's personal injuries suffered on the job, having
precluded the steel company from utilizing the defenses of contributory
104
negligence and assumption of risk.
The court's statutory analysis fell short,
though, by failing to answer why a nonprescriptive penal statute should displace
the common law standard of ordinary care in a civil action for negligence and
failing to explain why it construed the legislation as giving rise to absolute
.
liability.
105
The 1910 case of Peterson v. Standard Oil Co. involved a wrongful death
action by the administrator of a domestic maid who died when she tried to light a
106
fire of kerosene-soaked wood kindling.
The Supreme Court of Oregon
unanimously affirmed a trial court judgment based on negligence of the kerosene
manufacturer who had mislabeled a drum of"Water White Kerosene," indicating
107
the substance "would not bum under 120 degrees F·ahrenheit open-fire test." A
state statute made it a misdemeanor to fail to label properly containers of
108
petroleum distillates.
The opinion for the supreme court started off with a
curious discussion of the concept of judicial notice and its applicability to the
109
"dangerous qualities" of distillates like kerosene.
Concluding that it was
proper to take judicial notice of the explosive qualities of kerosene, the supreme
court attempted to bolster this conclusion by citing the Oregon petroleum
labeling statute a violation of which the court interpreted as "constitut[ing]

102. ld. at 233.
103. !d.
104. Id Still, the court conceded that "[a] causal connection between the unlawful
employment and the injury .•. must be shown." !d.
105. 106 P. 337 (Or. 1910), overruled by Nw. Door Co. v. Lewis Inv. Co., 180 P. 495, 504
(Or. 1919).
106. Id. at 338.
107. Id at 337-38.
108. Id. at 340 (quoting 1903 Or. Laws 103). The state act provided as follows:
Benzole, benzene, gasoline, naphtha, and distillates, must be sold under their true
names and grades, respectively, and such names and grades must be impressed, or
otherwise plainly marked, upon the barrel, can, or vessel in which the same is sold,
offered, or exposed for sale, respectively, or upon a label conspicuously and securely
fastened thereto; and every barrel, can, or vessel of kerosene or coal oil that is offered or
exposed for sale, shall be in like manner plainly marked or labeled with the word
kerosene or coal oil, and with the degree, Fahrenheit, of fire test below which the same
will not bum. Any person, firm, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this
section shall be fined the sum of not less than on~ hundred dollars ($100) nor more than
five hundred ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months~
1903 Or. Laws 103.
109. Peterson, 106 P. at 339-40.
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negligence per se" in a civil tort action. The supreme court cited a treatise on
negl~gence law as wei~ as appellate opinions from other stab~s in support of.its
11
negligence per se holdtng. The Supreme· Court of Oregon tn Peterson quoted
.extensively from the treatise, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence by
Seymour Thompson, as follows:
This seems to introduce in this place a consideration of the antithesis of
the proposition contained in the preceding paragraph the case where
the Legislature of the state, or the council of a municipal corporation,
having in view the promotion of the safety of th·e public ... commands
or forbids the doing of a particular act Here the general conception of
the courts, and the only one that is reconcilable with reason, is that the
failure to do the act commanded, or the doing of the act prohibited, is
negligence as mere matter of law, otherwise called negligence per se;
and this, irrespective of all questions of the exercise of prudence,
diligence, care, or skill; so that if it is the proximate cause of hurt or
damage to another, and if that other is without contributory fault, the
case is decided in his favor, and all that remains to be done is to assess
112
his damages.
The Peterson opinion followed up the treatise quotation with a quotation
from the Supreme Court ofMinnesota in a case involving a druggist who sold
poison without the label mandated by state statute:
Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the
duty is one imposed by the rule of the common law requiring the
exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a
statute designed for the protection of others. In either case the
failure to perform the duty constitutes negligence, and renders the
party liable for injuries resulting from it. The only difference is that
in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be· determined upon
common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it; so

110. !d. at 340.
111. Id (citing Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418,420-21 (1880); Browerv. Locke, 67 N.E. 1015,
1017 (Ind. App. 1903); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. Cuthbertson, 67 N.E. 558, 559 (Ind. App.
1903), aff'd, 73 N.E. 818 (Ind. 1905); Tobey v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 62 N.W. 761, 764
(Iowa 1895); Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543~ 543-44 (Minn. 1889); 1 SEYMOUR D.
THOiv1PSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ALL RELATIONS§§ 1Q-11, at 12-13
(1901)).
112. Id (quoting THOMPSON, supra note 111, § 10, at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of
113
negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se.
At this juncture in its Peterson opinion, the Oregon court focused on the
legal effect of violation of ~'a mere city ordinance'' in a civil tort suit because
"[i]n such cases a different question presents itself, namely, whether, under the
powers granted in a particular charter to prevent and regulate certain kinds of
business, the city ordinance will have the effect to give a person injured a
114
remedy" not available ''by a general statute upon the ... subject." According
to the court, violation of a city ordinance would be "mere evidence of
115
negligence"; the court traced this conclusion back to an Oregon precedent that
construed a violation by a railroad of a city speed ordinance as a breach of
116
contract that "could give [no] right of action to a third party" in a tort suit.
Then, the Peterson court returned to the Thompson treatise for a final flourish:
It is to be regretted that two or three authoritative courts have fallen into
the aberration of holding that the violation of a statute, or municipal
ordinance, enacted for the public safety, does not establish negligence
per se, but is merely ... 'evidence of negligence' that is to say,
competent but not conclusive evidence, to be submitted to the jury on
the question of negligence or no negligence. It seems to have escaped
the attention of the judges who have laid down this rule, that it has the
effect of clothing common juries with the dispensing power the power
to set aside acts of the Legislature a power exercised by the early
kings of England, though its exercise was odious to our ancestors, so
117
much so that the exercise of it disappeared with the Tudors.
.

.

The reasoning of Peterson, however, upon closer examination, is too clever
by half. First, the Oregon court assumed, without discussion, that the statutory
misdemeanor criminal standard constituted an absolute liability criminal offense;
yet, it is more probable that given constitutional norms of due process, a mens
rea intent to violate the standard would be required in any criminal
118
prosecution.
Second, the court failed to discuss why the state legislature's
.

.

113. Id. (quoting Osborne, 41 N.W. at 543-44) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. ld. at 341.
115. ld.
116. Id (citing Beck v. Portland & V. Ry. Co., 34 P. 753, 755 (Or. 1893), overruled by
Morgan v. Bross, 129 P. 118, 120 (Or. 1913)).
117. Id (quoting THOMPSON, supra note 111, § 11, at 12-13) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
118. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (fmding
that there is continuing constitutional importance to the mens rea principle and that this pri~ciple
must be given constitutional effect based on the Due Process Clause); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66,
86 (Nev. 2001) ("[A]n individual who lacks the mental capacity to form the requisite intent or mens
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criminal law enactment was mandated in a civil suit sounding in negligence
involving potentially high compensatory damages. Third, the Peterson court
incorrectly assumed that the common law standard of negligence was equivalent
with a criminal statutory standard. Indeed, negligence involves circumstantial
assessment of ordinary prudent care in individual, highly particularized contexts
whereas the criminal statute is more absolutist in tone (but, nevertheless,
softened in its potential impact on hapless violators by virtue of the tradition of
prosecutorial discretion to forego a criminal indictment in extenuating and
relatively minor cases). Fourth, the court's attempt to distinguish the tort law
effect of statutory violations, on the one hand, and violations of city ordinances,
on the other hand, is weak. Finally, the court makes the inapposite analogy of the
ancient practice of kingly dispensing power to acts of the legislature with the
traditional power of a common law jury in a civil action for negligence to
consider the applicability of a nonprescriptive criminal statute to a tort suit for
119
damages.
One final example of a judicial attempt to articulate and apply negligence
per se principles during the 1880-1920 time frame is the 1913 United States
Supreme Court opinion in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v.
120
McWhirter.
This case was a wrongful death action by the widow and
administratrix of a railroad flagman who was killed while working on a freight
121
train.
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the railroad's part because of its
violation of a federal statute which made it unlawful for interstate railroads to
require their employees to remain on the job longer than sixteen consecutive
122
hours. In reviewing a state court judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff
against the railroad, which a state appellate court affirmed, Chief Justice White,
writing for the Court, reversed the lower court's holding that the railroad's
violation of the quasi-criminal federal statute on consecutive work hours was
123
negligence per se that justified a verdict for the plaintiff. The Chief Justice
opined for the Court:
.

.

[T]hete would seem to be little doubt that [the state appellate court
opinion] was intended to hold that the effect of the violation of the
Hours of Service Act was to create an unconditional liability for all
accidents happening during the period beyond the statutory time
irrespective of proof showing a connection between the accident and the

rea of a criminal offense cannot be convicted of that offense without violating the due process
provisions of the United States and Nevada Constitutions.").
119. Peterson, 106 P. at 341.
120. 229 u.s. 265 (1913).
121. ld. at 266.
122. ld. at 266--67 (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2939, § 2, 34 Stat. 1415, 1416 (repealed
1994)).
123. Jd at 279-80, 283.
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working over time. In other words, the ruling was that by operation of
law the carrier is an insurer of the safety of all his employes while
124
working beyond the statutory time.
The Supreme Court in McWhirter disagreed with the construction of the
federal railroad consecutive work hours statute given by the court below because
the text of the statute gave no "support for the conclusion that it was the purpose
of Congress in adopting it to subject carriers to the extreme liability of insurers"
125
in a common law tort action for civil damages. The Court went on to reason:
We say this because although the act carefully provides punishment for
a violation of its provisions, nowhere does it intimate that there was a
purpose to subject the carrier who allowed its employes to work beyond
the statutory time to liability for all accidents happening during such
period without reference to whether the accident was attributable to the
act of working over time. And we think that where no such liability is
expressed in the statute it cannot be supplied by implication. It requires
no reasoning to demonstrate that the general rule is that where
negligence is charged, to justify a recovery it must be shown that the
126
alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the damage.
The Supreme Court's opinion in McWhirter is refreshing in that it looks to
the text of the relevant statute for any indication that Congress prescribed tort
law remedies for litigants in civil cases who could establish that a defendant
violated the statute. The Court made the important distinction conceptually
ignored by most courts that addressed the negligence per se doctrine during this
early period of the doctrine's development that while the statute carefully
prescribed quasi-criminal penalties for its breach, no language in the statute
prescribed negligence as a matter of law where proof was adduced from a
statutory violation. Still, the Court's reasoning was arguably too narrow in
finding the statutory predicate to require proof of proximate causation
connecting the tort injury and the law's violation. A broader reason for rejecting
a negligence per se construction of a nonprescriptive federal statute would have
been that the apparent purpose of Congress in passing the quasi-criminal statute
was to authorize the government to seek appropriate quasi-criminal penalties
against interstate railroads that kept their employees working more than sixteen
straight hours, not to change the common law of negligence in civil actions by
private litigants.
.

124. !d. at 279.
125. !d. at 280.
126. !d.

.
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III. MARTIN V. HERZOG AND LATER NEGLIGENCE PER SE JUDICIAL FLUBS

A. Benjamin Cardozo; Martin v. Herzog, and the Nature of the Judicial
Process
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo's ''j udicial opinions, first as a justice of the New
York Court of Appeals (1916-1932) and then as an associate justice of the
United States Supreme Court (1932-1938), especially in the law of torts, still
find a place in the casebooks, often as living law" or "as classical expositions of
127
the law of his day and model exemplars of the jurist's art." Indeed, "[w]hat
distinguishes Cardozo from all but a handful of American judges of the past
128
century were his extra-judicial writings on the law." It is a fair comment that
''[p]erhaps no other judge save Learned Hand has distilled so much judicial
129
experience into his writings as did Cardozo.'' Cardozo was chiefly concerned
130
in these writings with the judicial process.
While some observers have noted the eclectic nature of Cardozo's judicial
style, the most controversial insight is that he was, at heart, and as revealed in his
131
judicial opinions, a Platonist.
As fathomed in a 1939 law review article on
Cardozo's legal philosoph , Edwin W. Patterson discerned that Cardozo sought
Platonic 'essences,' overarching realities that exist as universals and possess an
independent existence beyond our perception of them, that ideas are real, not

127. Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, CARDOZO ON THE LAW 3, 4
(1982).
128. Id at 5.
129. Id. Cardozo's extra-judicial writings "are disquisitions of a mature and experienced
judge, and they are devoted both to understanding what a judge does and what he ought to do.'' I d.
Compare those views with the modem case of United States Court of Appeals Judge, Richard A.
Posner who has, in both quantity and quality, reflected on the role of American judges in his judicial
and extra-judicial writings. See Robert F. Blomquist, Introduction to THE QUOTABLE JUDGE
POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM
TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS
OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
OF RICHARD. A. POSNER
.
.
.
.
.
(Robert F. Blomquist ed., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author); RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUD,GES THINK (2008).
130. See, e.g., BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-10 (1921),
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO
BRAHE 107, 10~9 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (introducing Cardozo's discussion of the judicial
process). For general background on Cardozo's judicial career, see GEORGE S. HELLMAN,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: ANlERICAN JUDGE (1940); IRVING LEHNIAN, THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE
CARDOZO ON THE COMiviON LAW (1942); JOSEPH P. POLLARD, MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO: A LmERAL
MIND IN ACTION (Greenwood Press 1970) (1935); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO; A STUDY IN
REPUTATION (1990) [hereinafter POSNER]; SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN
CARDOZO, supra; Edwin W. Patterson, Cardozo's Philosophy ofLaw, 88 U~ PA~ L. REV. 71 (1939).
131. See Barnes, supra note 127, at 7.
132. Patterson, supra note 130, at 78-81.
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merely symbolic contrivances" and that "Cardozo really did search for
133
universals" in his jurisprudence.
Despite his universalist tendencies and Platonist approach to deciding cases
as an appellate judge, Cardozo's famous book about judging reveals a less
essentialist judicial philosophy. The public reaction to Cardozo's first book34
length opus, The Nature of the Judicial Process/ published in 1921 the same
135
year that it was delivered as a series of lectures at Yale "was extraordinary."
Thus, "[a]t one extreme [the book] had about it something of titillation: a serving
[state] justice of one of the most highly reputed supreme benches in the country
[the Court of Appeals of New York] was revealing all about how seven grave

133. Barnes, supra note 127, at 7. But see Stanley C. Brubaker, The Moral Element in
Cardozo's Jurisprudence, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1979) (arguing that Cardozo was a Platonist in
the sense that the law should function to perfect society at large and individual citizens). I do not
mean to label Cardozo in a pejorative sense with a Platonist label; I acknowledge that some more
recent scholars offer a different picture of Cardozo. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the
Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1461-73 (1999) (arguing that Justice Cardozo employed a pragmatic
form of conceptualism in his decision making); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Moral ofMacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1812-24 (1998) (articulating Justice Cardozo's
belief that one could deploy the concept of duty in negligence law in a manner that was progressive
and pragmatic without being an instrumentalist). Yet, other commentators have criticized Cardozo
in ways that roughly relate to the abstraction and essentialism of a Platonistic approach to the law.
Judge Richard A. Posner surveys a few of these criticisms in his book. See POSNER, supra note 130,
at 11-18. According to Judge Posner, "Warren Seavey ... used to deride Cardozo's aphoristic
style~" !d. at 1 L Grant Gilmore ~'tenns Cardozo 'mysterious ... almost mysticaL'" Id at 12
(quoting GRANT G~MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 74 (1977)). Alfred Konefsky discerned
an "elliptical, convoluted, and incomprehensible method" in Cardozo's opinion writing. Id at 15
(citing Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny
College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 645 (1987)). John Noonan ''accuses Cardozo of deficiency in
empathy, of suppressing critical facts, and of blindness to ... human issues.'' ld at 16 (citing JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLl'vlES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE
AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 144 (1976)). G. Edward White argued that Cardozo's judicial opinions
"'were at times close to being disingenuous"'; that his '"interpretation of his office ... juxtaposed a
private craving for certainty and predictability against a public acceptance of the complexities of
modem life'"; and that"[h]is method in writing opinions was 'to lay bare the competing elements in
a case and then to make it appear as if their cJash had been resolved by someone other than
himself"' ld at 18 (quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROF~ES
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 208, 212 (3d ed. 2007)). Although Judge Posner himself has some
good things to say about Cardozo's judicial method, he criticizes Cardozo for being, in certain
opinions, a "rhetorician ... rather than [a] pragmatic policy analyst," and he argues that while
"Cardozo is committed to a pragmatic approach ... he frequently is unable to make [it] operational
so that its application can be predicted." ld at 53; cf BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
THEORY 29 (2004) (stating that while Cardozo often wrote "thoughtful and well-crafted opinions"
and argued in his nonjudicial writings for ''the judicial role as a creative part of a process for making
law serve social needs," nevertheless, ''[i]ronically, many of Cardozo's opinions, including some of
his better-known decisions, read more like the work of a formalist than that of a legal realist, though
this may only reflect Cardozo's bel~efs about how decisions should be presented").
134. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 107.
135. Barnes, supra note 127, at 9.
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136

jurists handle the law." And, "[a]t the other extreme, there was a sense of
triumph that a judge was finall . coming clean and demonstrating that what
the facts of a case.
The Nature of the Judicial Process famously was the first judicial
explanation "to demonstrate in a systemic treatment how the judge was a
138
legislator" in sometimes making law.
Yet, Cardozo's book articulated
limitations on judicial lawmaking as well. First, judges should not legislate, he
139
argued, when ''the law is so clear that judges have no discretion.'' Moreover,
according to Cardozo's parlance, to determine wh·ether a gap in the law exists,
judges should first attempt to find apt analogies, appropriate historical teachings,
140
and community traditions. "If one (or more) of these methods when applied to
the case indicates that there is a 'gap' requiring judicial legislation, then
141
'sociology' will be the approach taken to fill it." For Cardozo, this ''method of
sociology" to fill gaps in the law by judicial legislation should entail ·' justice,
142
morals and social welfare, the mores of the day" as guideposts.
Despite Cardozo's ambition to rationalize and essentialize the process of
judging, a close reading of The Nature of the Judicial Process shows that judicial
thinking entails open-textured and largely subjective considerations. Consider
the following passages in his book. First, Cardozo acknowledges:
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name,
have been tugging at them inherited instincts, traditional beliefs,
acquired convictions; and th·e resultant is an outlook on life, a
conception of social needs, a sense in [William] James' phrase of ''the
total push and pressure of the cosmos," which, when reasons are nicely
143
balanced, must determine where choice shall fa11.
Second, Cardozo admits that his judicial quest really boils down to
'''introspective searchings of the spirit":
In this mental background every problem finds its setting. We may try to
see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see
them with any eyes except our own. To that test they are all brought a

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id at 10.
!d.
CARDOZO,

supra note 130, at 160.

ld. at 116~117.
Barnes, supra note 127, at 12.
CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 117.
Id at 109-10.
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f?rm of pl~ading or _an act o~ parliament, t~e wrongs of Raupers or the
44
rights ofprtnces, a village ordinance or a nation's charter.
.

.

Third, Cardozo points out the deceptive certainty of judicial reliance on
statutes as sources of law in adjudication. As the following excerpt demonstrates,
the meaning of a statute is fraught with multiple questions of interpretation that
are hard to answer when judging:
Our first inquiry should ... be: Where does the judge find the law which
he embodies in his judgment? There are times when the source is
obvious. The rule that fits the case may be supplied by the constitution
or by statute. If that is so, the judge looks no farther. The
correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey. The constitution
overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution,
overrides the law of judges. In this sense, judge-made law is secondary
and subordinate to the law that is made by legislators. It is true that
codes and statutes do not render the judge superfluous, nor his work
perfunctory and mechanical. There ate gaps to be filled. There are
doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are hardships and wrongs to
be mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were
nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which, however
obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable preexistence in the legislator's mind. The process is, indeed, that at times,
but it is often something more. The ascertainment of intention may be
the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute. "The
fact is,'' says Gray ... ~'that the difficulties of so-called interpretation
arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question
which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges
have to do is, not to detertnine what the legislature did mean on a point
which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended
145
on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present."
.

.

Fourth, speaking of the flux in the law, Cardozo opined: "For every
tendency, one seems to see a counter-tendency; for every rule its antimony.

144. Id at 110. This view is comparable to a later observation by Cardozo in his book, noting
that after a judge exhausts "logic," "analogies," and ''philosophies," "[h]istory or custom or social
utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension
of the pervading spirit of our law, must come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where
to go.'' Id at 122 (emphasis added).
145. ld. at 110-11 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF 1HE LAW
173 (Macmillan Co. 1921) (1909)).
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Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an
146
endless 'becoming.' We are back with Heraclitus."
Fifth, Cardozo realized that symmetry and uniformity in a judge's
147
interpretation of law ''may be bought at too high a price." He explained this
concern as follows:
Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of
oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness
or other elements of social welfare~ These may enjoin upon the judge the
duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the path along new
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which others who
148
come after him will set out upon their journey.
And yet, "[i]f you ask [Cardozo] how he is to know when one interest
outweighs another," he responds with utter subjectivity: "I can only answer that
[a judge] must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience
1 9
and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself." Lt Moreover, a judge,
according to Cardozo, "legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in
the law. How far he may ~o without travelin~ beyond th~ walls of the inter~tices
1 0
cannot be staked out for htm upon a chart" Rather, a Judge "must learn tt for
himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes with years of
151
habitude in the practice of an art." So, "[e ]ven within the gaps" of the evolving
law in a particular field, "restrictions not easy to define, but felt, however

impalpable they may be . .. h_edge and circumscribe [a judge's] action."

152

Therefore, "[t ]he law which is the resulting product" of this judicial search is, in
Cardozo's words, ''not found, but made. The process, b,eing legislative, demands
153
the legislator's wisdom.," Perhaps a useful coda in Cardozo's discussion of the
judge as a cabined legislator is his admiring quotation of the first article of the
Swiss Civil Code of 1907:
The statute ... governs all matters within the letter or the spirit of any of
its mandates. In default of an applicable statute, the judge is to

146. !d. at 115-16.
147. Id at 154.
148. Id
149. Id.
150. Id
151. !d.
152. ld. (emphasis added).
153. ld. at 155. Cardozo hedges this broad, subjective view of a judge's law-finding by
,claiming that "[o ]bscurity of statute_or of precedent or of customs or of morals" are "occasional and
relatively rare" and should not "blind Oudges '] eyes to the. innumerable instances where there is
neither obscurity nor collision nor opportunity for diverse judgment." Id at 159-60.
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pronounce judgment according to the customary law, and in default of a
custom according to the rules which he would establish if he were to
assume the part of a legislator. He is to draw his inspiration, however,
from the solutions consecrated by the doctrine of the learned and the
154
jurisprudence of the courts ....
Benjamin Cardozo was a judge on New York's top appellate court for a
mere seven years when he published The Nature of the Judicial Process in
155
1921. Just the year before, in 1920, Cardozo authored the majority opinion for
156
the Court of Appeals of New York in Martin v. Herzog. Nowhere in his book,
157
Yet; there was a profound
however, does he mention the Martin opinion.
disconnect between Cardozo's easygoing subjectivity articulated in his book and
his rigid tendencies in Martin, where he famously asserted the universal bromide
that "unexcused omission of the statuto . signals is more than some evidence of
159

the negligence per se approach and went on to recognize "relaxation" of the
doctrine "where the one who complains of the omission is not a member of the
160
and ~'where the
class for whose protection the safeguard is designed"
161
safeguard is prescribed by local ordinance, and not by statute.'' But Cardozo
would brook no flexibility in the case at bar, which involved a collision between
an automobile and a buggy where the buggy failed to travel with lights at night
162
in violation of a state highway statute. Cardozo reasoned:
Lights are intended for the guidance and protection of other travelers on
the highway. By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit, willfully or
heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of
another ... is to fall short of the standard of diligence to which those
163
who live in organized society are under a duty to confonn.
In Cardozo's view, the court should not have allowed the jurors to determine
under all the facts and circumstances leading up to the roadway accident whether

154. Id. at 164 (quoting Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907,
art. 1 (Switz.), translated in THE SWISS CIVIL CODE OF DECENIBER 10, 1907 (Robert P. Shick trans.,
Boston Book Company 1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cardozo's translation appears to
be unique but does not differ in substance from the Shick translation.
155. See ANDREWL. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 129, 199 (1998).
156. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
157. See CARDOZO, supra note 130.
158. Martin, 126 N.E. at 815.
159. See id.
160. ld.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 814-16.
163. Id. at 815 (internal citations omitted).
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164

He

the buggy driver was at fault in failing to having lights on his buggy.
reasoned as follows:

In the case at hand, we have an instance of the admitted violation of
a statute intended for the protection of travelers on the highway .... Yet
the jurors were instructed in effect that they were at liberty in their
discretion to treat the omission of lights either as innocent or as
culpable. They were allowed to "consider the default as lightly or
gravely" as they would .... They might as well have been told that they
could use-a like discretion in holding a master at fault for the omission
of a safety appliance prescribed by positive law for the protection of a
workman. Jurors have no dispensing power, by which they may relax
the duty that one traveler on the highway owes under the statute to
another. It is error to tell them that they have. The omission of these
lights was a wrong, and, being wholly unexcused, was also a negligent
wrong. No license should have been conceded to the triers of the facts to
165
find it anything else.
In closing his opinion in Martin, Cardozo noted that "causal connection
between the negligence and the injury" is required in negligence cases, but that
given "evidence of a collision occurring more than an hour after sundown
between a car and an unseen buggy, proceeding without lights, is evidence from
which a causal connection may be inferred between the collision and the lack of
166
signals. "
For a number of reasons, Cardozo's negligence per se reasoning in Martin v.
Herzog was deficient and against his theoretical musings on the judicial process
in his eponymous book. In the first place there was no "gap" in the law for the
Court of Appeals of New York to fill. A common law jury was doing its
traditional function of applying the appropriate standard of care to the contextual
facts in the case. The court should have allowed the jury to weigh the fact that
the buggy driver was driving without lights (in violation of a quasi-criminal
traffic statute that made no reference to its binding applicability in a civil suit for
damages) with the fact of the automobile driver's lack of care ''in swerving from
167
the center of the road'' into the lane of the oncoming buggy, which happened
168
also to violate a general state quasi-criminal highway safety statute. Cardozo's
opinion, however, aggressively usurped the jury's sifting and balancing of the
evidence adduced at trial and improperly denigrated the automobile driver's

164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
ld. (internal citations omitted).
I d. at :816.
Jd.
168. ld at 814 (citing N.Y. HIGH. LAW§§ 286(3), 332 (McKinney 1917)).
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violation of the statutory command to stay right of the road center. It was
illogical, in this regard, for Cardozo to contend that the automobile driver "may
have been negligent in swerving from the center of the road; but he did not run
into the buggy purposely, nor was h~ driving while intox~cated, nor was h~ goin~
1
at such a reckless speed that wamtng would of necessity have been futtle."
The aforementioned contingencies were immaterial to the automobile driver's
lack of due care in failing to stay in his own lane purposely running into the
buggy would have been an intentional tort; not purposely running into the
oncoming buggy was of no legal consequence in a tort suit sounding in
negligence; not being intoxicated was no excuse for forgiving swerving into the
lane of oncoming traffic; and not speeding was no excuse for going into the other
170
lane.
In the second place, Cardozo's opinion in Martin abrogated, in the name of
negligence per se, the jury's implicit finding that the buggy driver's violation of
the general highway statute prescribing a running li~ht was not the proximate
71
cause of the automobile colliding with the buggy.
Judge Hogan cogently
explained in his dissent:
I cannot concur that we may infer that the absence of a light on the front
of the [buggy] was not only the cause, but the proximate cause, of the
accident. Upon the evidence adduced upon the trial and the credence
attached to the same [by the jury], the fact has been determined that the
accident would have been avoided, had the defendant been upon his side
of the road, or attentive to where he was driving along a public highway,
or had he been driving slowly, used his sense of sight, and observed
plaintiff and her intestate as he approached them; they being visible at
the time . . . . The jury found that the accident happened as claimed by
the plaintiff and her witnesses, and we cannot surmise or infer that the
accident would not have happened, had a light been located on the
[buggy]. 112
In the third place, Cardozo's opinion in Martin fails to explicitly interpret
the general highway statute requiring running lights on vehicles; instead, he
simply assumes by wooden and unpragmatic reasoning that violation of any
statute "is more than some evidence of negligence," but ''is negligence in

169. Id at 816.
170. As the dissenting opinion of Judge Hogan pointed out, moreover, the majority opinion in
Martin discounted and overlooked evidence that the automobile driver who swerved into the
buggy's lane was speeding, that the evening of the accident was not dark, and that the road was lit
up by moonlight, electric lights along the highway, and by the defendant's automobile.Jd at 81718 (Hogan, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 816 (majority opinion).
172. !d. at 820 (Hogan, J., dissenting).
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itself." "Substituting form and phrases for substance," in the dissent's turn of
74
phrase/ undermines Cardozo's quest, as stated in The Nature of the Judicial
Process, for serious and thoughtful statutory construction and interpretation by
175
judges.
Fourth, Cardozo's negligence per se analysis in Martin flies in the face of
his call in The Nature of the Judicial Process for judicial balancing of
"uniformity," "symmetry," and "certainty" in law with ''the social interest served
176
by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare."

B. 1921-2000
During the eighty-year period that followed Cardozo's opinion in Martin v.
Herzog, state and federal court opinions mentioned negligence per se principles
177
in over 10,000 opinions. Many of these judicial opinions mechanically intoned
black letter law on the nature and relevance of nonprescriptive statutory
provisions in civil actions for negligence. My aim in discussing these opinions is
to select a few prominent examples of the problematic corpus of negligence per
.
se analysis while pointing out the rare o;inions that rise above th~ mud~le.
17
In the 1925 case of Day v. Pauly, the Supreme Court ofWtsconstn apphed
negligence per se principles to hold an injured motorist contributorily negligent
179
for violating a statute by "cut[ting] a corner" at an intersection. As a result,
under the prevailing ali-or-nothing liability regime then in place, the court denied
the plaintiff recovery for injuries despite the negligence by the defendant
180
motorist.
181
In the 1939 case of Fairchild v. Dean, the Supreme Court of Washington
rigidly interpreted a criminal statute, which penalized motorists for passing

173. Id at 815 (majority opinion).
174. Id at 820 (Hogan, J., dissenting). But cf WHITE, supra note 133, at 234-35 (noting that
Judge Learned Hand's theory of statutory interpretation focused on a judge "determining the
primary purposes of a statute" but "required judges to maintain the delicate balance between
creativity and restraint that he associated with wisdom in the judiciary''). Cardozo's approach in
Martin was more akin to tne statutory interpretation philosophy of California Supreme Court Justice
Roger Traynor involving a "symbiotic relationship" between legislatures and courts. See id at 255.
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
176. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 154.
177. Based on a Westlaw search in the "all cases" database with a query ''negligence per se''
between February 20, 1920 and February 20, 2000 (search conducted on Nov. 2, 2009).
178. 202 N.W. 363 (Wis. 1925).
179. Id at 364-65.
180. See id at 365--66.
181. 86 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1939). But see Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939)
(illustrating judicial interpretation to a:void a fmding of an unexcused statutory violation). In Ted/a,
the plaintiff was walking with his back to o~coming traffic in violation of a statute mandating
pedestrians to walk facing oncoming traffic. Id at 988 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 85(6)
(Baldwin 1938)). The court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff should be barred
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without a clear view of more than 200 yards, to reverse the trial court's finding
182
The motorist had passed a truck
that the defendant motorist was not at fault.
on a strange highway on a foggy morning and collided with a car that could not
183
be seen coming around a curve.
184
In the 1948 case of Garbacz v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co., the
Supreme Court of Michigan mechanically utilized negligence per se to foreclose
a tractor-trailer driver from having a jury resolve his negligence claim against a
185
railroad. The case involved a nighttime railroad crossing accident, which the
driver claimed was caused by ''the blinker warning signals at the crossing ... not
working" and "no bells or whistles sound[ing]," lulliny him to believe that he
86
could safely cross the tracks at a reduced rate of speed. The case appeared to
involve substantial negligence by the railroad in maintaining deficient crossing
187
signals and the train engineer's failure to sound a whistle or bell. However, the
court deemed the truck driver's objectively reasonable decision to slow down,
rather than stop, at the crossing to be negligence per se in light of a state statute
requiring heavy trucks to "'com[e] to a full stop within 50 feet but not less than
188
10 feet from . . . railroad tracks '·"
and the violation of his state carrier
certificate, which also required the driver to come to a complete stop at railroad
189
crossings. Finding negligence per se in the driver's violations of the statutes,
the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the lower court's directed verdict for the
190
railroad because of the contributory negligence rule then in effect.
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify
negligence per se principles in Federal Employment Liability Act cases
involving railroad workers in 0 'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway
191
Co.
Justice Jackson's majority opinion, however, candidly unearthed
192
numerous doctrinal deficiencies concerning negligence per se. First, Jackson
observed that an overarching problem could be "traceable to the diversity of
judicial opinion concemin~ the consequences attributed in negligence actions to
93
the violation of a statute." Second, he noted that "[b]reach of certain statutes
.

.

. .

.

from recovery because he was contributorily negligent per se. ld at 991. The court reached its
conclusion, in part, by concluding that it would have been more dangerous for the plaintiff to have
complied with the statute than to violate it and that the statute at issue was a mere "rule of the road.''
Id at 991.
182. Fairchild, 86 P.2d at 272-73.
183. Id. at 271-72.
184. 34 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1948).
185. !d. at 533.
186. Id at 532.
187. See id
188. Id (quoting Act No. 191, 1941 Mich. Pub. Acts 287).
189. Id at 532-33.
190. Id. at 533 (citing Benaway v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 295 N.W. 536, 538 (Mich. 1941)).
191. 338 U.S~ 384 (1949).
192. See id. at 389-93.
193. !d. at 389.
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in various jurisdictions will be regarded as some evidence of negligence, to be
194
weighed by the jury along with the facts." Third, Jackson asserted that "[a]t
other times or places, or under other statutes, a violation may be 'prima facie' or
'presumptive' evidence of negligence which [the opposing party] must meet or
195
overcome." Fourth, confusion was exacerbated because "[c]ourts sometimes
talk of [statutory violations] in terms of res ipsa loquitur or treat violations as
196
negligence per se."
Fifth, as Jackson went on to point out, "[i]t is not
uncommon that within the same jurisdiction the rule is different as to different
197
statutes."
Sixth, Jackson neatly summarized the chaotic state of American
negligence per se principles by contending that "usually, unless the statute sets
up a special cause of action for its breach, a violation becomes an ingredient, of
. ht, zn
. eterm1n1ng t he uttzmate
.
. oif neg zgence. ,198
greater or lesser wezg
questzon
Yet, in spite of Justice Jackson's yeoman job in identifying the aforementioned
199
inconsistencies in negligence per se doctrine, the Court's holding in the case
instantiated a seventh doctrinal deficiency of negligence per se law. That is, in
some cases (incompletely theorized as "absolute'' liability) the violation of a
200
statute '"is not excused by any showing of care however assiduous. '"
This
principle is confusingly akin to negligence per se without excuses.
The diverging opinions of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the 1954 case,
201
Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., illustrate the vague and indetenninate nature of the
classic two-part inquiry used by judges to decide the propriety of adopting a
quasi-criminal statute as the standard of care in a negligence case. Under this
inquiry, "[t]he judge must examine the statute in order to determine ... whether
the statute was designed to protect against the type of harm suffered by the
plaintiff, and whether the class of persons designed to be protected by the statute
202
includes the plaintiff. " As noted by one recent treatise on torts, "[t ]his [twostep] determination is wholly for the judge to make and often is no easy task.,
203
investing the judge with great discretion~ "
Indeed, in Ney, a state statute

a

..

z·

194. Id at 390 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 283 (1894); Hayes v.
Mich. Cent. R. Co., 111 U.S. 228, 240 (1884)).
195. Id
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. "[T]o equip a car with a coupler which broke . . . was a violation of the [Safety
Appliance] Act, which rendered defendant liable ... , and ... neither evidence of negligence nor of
diligence of care was to be considered on the question of ... liability." ld. at 394.
200. Id at 390-91 (quoting Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass·'n, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938)).
201. 117 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. 1954).
202. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 6.02, at 95 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING TORTS SECOND EDITION] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS§ 286 (1965)).
203. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Traynor once noted that "[t]he decision as to what the civil
standard should be still rests with the co~ and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a

THE TROUBLE WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE

2009]

255
04

rendered unlawful leaving one's keys in the ignition of an unattended vehicle?
The Ney majority found that the statute provided a negligence per se standard
when a plaintiffs automobile was hit b~ a taxi after it had been stol~n by a third
2
party. Contrary to the statute, the taxi had been left unattended with the motor
206
running and the key in the ignition.
The Ney majority looked to assorted
provisions of the Illinois statute to conclude that the state legislature, through the
key-removal command, intended to protect the public from harm to their
207
property and person.
According to the opinion for the court, there was no
indication that the legislature had intended to make a legal distinction between
208
harm triggered by a criminal act, like stealing a car, and other forms of harm~
The diss.e nt in Ney interpreted the key-in-the-ignition statute in a way that was
diametrically opposed to the majority's interpretation, concluding that there was
no direct indication that the legislature had contemplated harm ·caused by a car
thief in contradistinction to injury occasioned by negligent or inadvertent
209
operation of the vehicle. Therefore, the dissent argued it was inappropriate for
the judiciary to infer that the statute was intended to prevent the accident which
10
took place?
.
211
Wenninger v. United States, a 1964 wrongful death case involving the
violation by air traffic controllers of a federal administrative rule, provides
another prominent example of the exercise of improvident judicial discretion in
interpreting the ambiguous p.urpose of a nonprescriptive statutory or
administrative rule. The plaintiffs decedent was flying his private airplane when
turbulence, caused by a military aircraft operating in a zone where military
212
planes were prohibited, caused him to crash.
The federal district court held
that an air traffic control regulation that barred military aircraft from flying in a
civilian area did not result in negligence per se because the apparent purpose of
the regulation was not to protect civilian flyers but only to increase the efficiency
213
of Air Force flights.
However, the purpose of a federal air traffic control
system that seeks to separate relatively high-powered and freewheeling military
aircraft from less powerful and mobile private aircraft would seem to be the
protection of both civilian and military air travelers.

°

.

.

police regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because
the court accepts it.'' Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943).
204. 117 N.E.2d at 76.
205. Id at 76, 78.
206. Id. at 76.
207. Id at 77-78.
208. !d.
209. ld. at 81 (Hershey, J., dissenting) ..
210. Id
.
211. 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), a.ff'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir~ 1965) (per curiam).
212. I d. at 508.
213. Id at 511.
.
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In Hanrahan v. McClatchy, a federal trial court appears to have confused
the distinction between the purposes of the negligence per se doctrine to
protect a class of people and to prevent a particular type of injury and the
proximate cause nexus requirement between a statutory violation and a
215
plaintiffs injury. The plaintiff, "a passenger in an automobile which failed to
yield the right of way at a stop intersection," sought tort damages against the
driver of the other automobile involved in the collision, which was in the wrong
216
lane on a two-way street. The plaintiff argued that because the driver of the
other car had violated a provision of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the court
217
sho~d hold that driver to be nefligent p~r se. The court ~ejected the plaintiff's
21
negligence per se argument.
Accordtng to the reasoning of the court, the
purpose and interests that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to protect by
requiring motor vehicles to stay on the right side of a two-way street were not
219
applicable to an intersection accident. Moreover, according to the court, the
violation of the right lane statute by the other motorist was not the immediate
220
cause of the intersection accident. Accordingly, the jury was required to weigh
the intent of the statute and proceed upon the evidence to be presented at trial to
22
make a determination of negligenc.e.
Decisions like Hanrahan make a jury's job more difficult than it already is
in a common law negligence suit. It might be proper for a jury to consider the
statutory violation as evidence of negligence, which is weighed in the balance of
both drivers' ostensible violations of motor vehicle rules one prohibiting
driving on the wrong side of the road, the other prohibiting running stop signs222
but it is manifestly not the province of a jury to weigh the intent of a statute.
We should nevertheless be sympathetic with the court in trying valiantl~ to sort
2 3
out the ambiguous muddle of negligence per se principles in hard cases.
.

.

.

214. 384 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a.ff'd, 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974).
215. See id at 18-21.
216.Jd. at 17.
217.Jd at 17-18.
218.Jd at 21.
219.ld. at 19.
220.Id at 21.
221. See id.
222. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 6.02, at 85 (3d ed. 2007)

[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION] (noting that a decision about the intent of a
statute "is wholly for the judge to make").
223. But compare Hanrahan to the simpler case of Ward v. McDan Dav Leasing Corp., 340 F.
Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 683 (3d. Cir. 1973), where the, negligence per se analysis
was indubitably correct. In that wrongful death action, a steel shipper and manufacturer violated a
state statute by allowing a piece of steel to fall off a truck onto a public highway. !d. at 89, 96. The
presenc.e of the steel beam caused an accident that resulted in the decedent's death. Id at 88. The
court gave judgment to the plaintiff, reasoning that the statute was designed to protect other users of
the highway from accidents occasioned by dislodged foreign objects in the road./d at 96.
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The conflict between judicial opinions in the 1980 Louisiana case, McCloud
224
v. Parish of Jefferson,
is emblematic of a further source of negligence per se
25
doctrinal confusion the public duty exception? The plaintiffs in McCloud
sued a parish ''for damag.es to themselv.es and their property" resulting from the
local government's failure to maintain an effective drainage system as mandated
226
by a Louisiana statute. The appellate -court majority reversed the trial court's
27
dismissal of the suit and remanded the case for further trial court. proceedings?
The dissent argued that the lower court's decision should have been affirmed
be,cause the plaintiffs had not alleged that the parish had breached a duty that it
228
owed to them. The dissent contended that legislative enactments involved in
the case at bar, which created departments of government and granted them
essential powers, are not intended ''to protect the interests of any [one] individual
except as they secure to all members of the community the enjoyment of rights
229
and privileges to which they are entitled only as members of the public."
Accordingly, as pressed by the dissent, governmental "[n]eglect in the
performance of such [public statutory] requirements [should not]
230
create[] · ~ · .. civil liability to individuals."
The diss.e nt in McCloud was motivated by analogous tort policy
considerations in nonstatutory common law negligence actions a ainst
yet, if the Louisiana legislature commanded the Parish of Jefferson to maintain
properly a public drainage system, it would appear that the dissent in McCloud
unduly minimized the plausible implicit legislative intent to protect parish
residents from flooding caused by a deficient public drainage system.
232
The 1990 California case of Seiger v. Steven Brothers, Inc.
involved
another confusing nuance of negligence per se statutory or ordinance
requirements of nearby property owners to maintain a sidewalk in a condition
233
that will not endanger pedestrians.
Seiger involved a city ordinance that

224. 383 So. 2d 477 (La. CLApp. 1980).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965) ("The court will not adopt as the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively ... to impose upon the actor the
performance of a service which the state. or any subdivision of it undertakes to give the public.").
226. McCloud, 383 So. 2d at 478.
227. !d. at 479.
228. Id at 484 (Chehardy, J., dissenting).
229. Id (quoting Steitz v. City of Beacon, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 1945)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
230. Id (quoting Steitz; 64 N.E.2d at 706) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that
with regard to police and frre protection, the government owes a duty to the public at large, not to
any particular individU;al; and therefore, the city was not liable in common law negligence for
failing to protect a young woman from a jilted suitor who ultimately .carried out his threats).
232. 272 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1990).
233. Id at 545-46.
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provided that '"[n]o person shall fail, refuse or neglect to keep the sidewalk in
front of his house, place of business or premises in a clean and wholesome
234
condition. "' The plaintiff sli~Eed on dog excrement on the sidewalk outside of
5
a nursery and hardware store.
She had previously undergone a hi implant,
judge instructed that the defendant store should be found negligent per se if the
237
jury found that the defendant violated the ordinance.
Accordingly, the trial
38
court entered judgment on a jury verdict of over $400,000 for the plaintiff? On
appeal, the California intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the
ordinance violation did not give rise to negligence per se:
[B]ecause the municipality has the primary responsibility for
maintaining the public sidewalks, statutes and ordinances which require
the abutting landowner to maintain the sidewalk in a condition that will
not endanger pedestrians have ... been interpreted not to create a
standard of care toward pedestrians but only a liability of the owner to
239
the municipality.
The Seiger appellate court rendered a fair and appropriate decision. But a
better rationale would have been one premised on fair proportionality between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries coupled with traditionally
posited lower status of a municipal ordinance violation as compared to a
240
violation of a state statute.
The trial court in Seiger deserves sympathetic
understanding, however, because a mechanical application of the two-part
purpose, which protects a class of persons from a particular type of harm,
appears, at first blush, to justify an instruction of negligence per se for violating
the ordinance.
241
A 1999 Alaska case, Cable v. Shefchik,
demonstrates recurrent judicial
confusion about negligence per se. A worker, who "severely injured his right
hand when it was caught in the rotating ... blade of a concrete pump," sued the
242
pump owner for negligence. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict
for the defendant, finding that the defendant's negligence ''was not the legal
43
cause of' the plaintiffs injuries? The Supreme Court of Alaska, however,

234. ld. at 546 (quoting L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE§ 41.46 (1964)).
235. ld.

236.Id
237. Id
238. Id
239. Id at 547.
240. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 98 (3d ed. 2005).
241. 985 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1999).
242. !d. at 475.
243. !d.
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reversed and remanded the action, holding that the trial court judge had ab,u sed
244
his discretion when he declined to instruct the jury on negligence per se. As
reasoned by the supreme court, the Alaska General Safety Code provisions for
industrial machinery "were not 'so obscure, oblique, or irrational' that, as a
245
matter of law, they could not provide an adequate standard of care." The court
ordered that "[t]he negligence per se instruction at the new trial should include"
language that the machine owner would be "negligent only if he committed an
246
unexcused violation of' the Alaska General Safety Code.
One wonders,
however, how a jury would be able to fathom better clarity from the safety code
provisions than the trial court judge.
247
The 2000 Wisconsin case, Totsky v. Riteway Bus Service, Inc., illustrates
judicial disarray over "excused violations'' of statutes used as negligence per se
standards. A motorist, whose car was struck by a school bus that skidded on ice
through a stop sign, sued the bus driver, among others, claiming negligence per
248
After the jury found neither motorist
se for violating the stop sign statute.
negligent, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the plaintiff because of the
bus ?ri':er's negligence per se in viol~tin~ the sto~-sign st~tute and the lack of
49
application of the emergency doctrine.
The Intennedtate appellate court
reversed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the appellate court's
250
According to the majority opinion of the state supreme court, the
decision.
emergency doctrine applied to excuse the bus driver's violation of the stop-sign
251
statute. The dissent, however, argued that the plain langua e of the stop-sign
to warp the concept of an excused emergency to allow a motorist to avoid civil
liability for violating a statute simply because the road at the intersection was
•
Icy.
253
A 2000 Washington case, Templeton v. Daffern (Estate of Templeton),
showcases unclear negligence per se reasoning by the appellate court. The estate
254
of a minor sued the social hosts of a party for negligence.
The minor was
involved in a fatal car crash after the party, at which he had consumed alcohol
55
obtained elsewhere? The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
(1965)).
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 478 (quoting Osborne v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1983)).
Id. at 479.
607 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 2000).
!d. at 640 41.
Id at 642.
Id at 642, 652.
Id at 649.
ld at 657 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A
990 P.2d 968 (Wash. Ct App~ 2000).
Id. at 970.
Id.
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256

granting of the social hosts' motion for summary judgment. In spite of the
defendants' breach of a state statutory duty not to allow a minor to consume
alcohol on their premises, the court reasoned that a common law duty in
Washington did not exist to prevent a minor from consuming alcohol furnished
257
by someone other than the social hosts.
Obviously, the appellate court was
-concerned about the limited duty that most courts have adopted for social host
258
liability for hosts who serve guests alcohol on their premises.
Yet, the
fundamental rationale of negligence per se is that if a specific statutory standard
of care exists, it should be judicially substituted for the general common law
259
negligence standard.

C. 2001-2006
We now turn to recent negligence per se cases adjudicated from 2001 to
2006. The commentary that follows discusses several judicial opinions. Alas,
many American courts continue to struggle with negligence per se principles and
to entangle the resolution of nonprescriptive statutory problems with confusing
and unsatisfactory analysis.

1. 2001
260

The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Claypool v. Hibberd, affinned a trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, Furnas County,
61
Nebraska, and two sheriff's deputies? A mother sued the defendants for the
wrongful death of her son, whom the defendants had arrested and released the
night before he committed suicide, alleging that the county officials' failure to
notify the son's parents violated the parental notification provision of a state
262
temporary-custody statute. As a result, the mother did not know that her son,
263
who was in a depressed, post-arrest state of mind, was alone in her house. The
supreme court held that the state statute did not create a duty for the defendants
264
to notify the parents of their son;s arrest.
A more convincing rationale,
however, would have focused on a lack of proximate causation.

256. Id at 975-76.
257. Id. at 973-75.
258. See JOHNSON, supra note 240, at 188.

259. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.01, at 84.
260. 626 N.W.2d 539 (Neb. 2001 ).
261. ld. at 541-42, 549.
262. !d. at 541-44.
263. See id. at 542-43.
264. Id at 546.

THE TROUBLE WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE

2009]

261

The Supreme Court of Nevada issued divergent opinions in Vega v. Eastern
265
Courtyard Associates. After a patron of a medical facility suffered personal
injuries when she slipped and fell on a ramJ? leading to the main entrance of a
266
building, she sued the facility for negligence. The trial court entered judgment
on a jury verdict for the defendant after refusing to issue jury instructions that the
fact that the ramp's slope exceeded the county's Uniform Building Code (UBC)
267
was negligence per se.
A majority of the supreme court reversed and
remanded the action, holding that a violation of a building code provision
adopted by county ordinance constituted negligence per se if the plaintiff
?~longed to the class of p~rsons the ~rdinance was intende~ to ~rotect a?d the
68
InJury was the sort the ordtnance was Intended to protect agatnst. The dtssent,
however, asserted that the trial court had properly instructed the jury that it could
269
-consider the UPC violation as evidence ofnegligence.
The disagreement by the dissent, of course, focused on the view that
"accord[s] negligence per se ... treatment to violations of legislative enactments
passed by a prestigious body, such as a state legislature, but treat[s] violations of
laws or regulations emanating from lower tribunals, such as a city council or
270
administrative agency [or county], as simply evidence of negligence.''
This
aspect of negligence per se jurisprudence, however, makes little sense when one
considers that city councils, counties, and administrative agencies enjoy mixtures
of prestigious, constitutionally-specified, and statutorily-delegated governmental
271
powers to promulgate various important safety standards.

2.

2002
272

In Dalmer v. State,
the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the trial
-c ourt's grant of ajud~ment as a matter of law for a state social servi~es center
73
and a state employee. In Dalmer, the parents of a runaway son clatmed that
the state defendants, by violating the state Juvenile Proceedings Act, were
274
negligent per se in taking and retaining custody ofthe boy. The supreme court
interpreted the state statute as providing no civil remedy for violation of the
75
statute in this case? The judicial result was affected by the public duty

265. 24 P.3d 219 (Nev. 2001).
266. !d. at 220.
267. Id at 220-21.
268. Id at 222.
269. Id. at223 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
270. JOHNSON, supra note 240, at 98 (emphasis omitted).
271. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 50 (2004); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 404 (2000).
272.
273.
274.
275.

811 A.2d 1214 (Vt. 2002).
Id. at 1217, 1227.
!d. at 1219.
ld at 1222 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 286(d) (196~)).
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doctrine, which makes courts hesitant to hold governmental litigants negligent
276
per se when administering statutes for the benefit of the public at large.
The Su reme Court of Ohio, in Wallace v. Ohio Department of
?rought by ~ersons inj.ur:d in a fireworks store and th~ estates of persons kill~d
78
tn the store. The platnttffs alleged that the state offictal was neghgent per se tn
failing to perform an adequate fire safety inspection of the store as required by
279
state statutes.
The court held that the State could not raise the public duty
doctrine as a bar to liability for negligence in actions brought in the court of
280
claims. A dissent argued that, without the protection of the public duty rule,
government actors would be vulnerable to liability under statutes that charge
281
agencies of the state with public or general protective duties.

3.

2003
282

The Tennessee intermediate appellate court, in Rains v. Bend of the River,
reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss brought by a defendant
283
who sold ammunition to an underage buyer. The decedent's parents sued the
seller in a wrongful death action, asserting that the seller was negligent per se in
selling ammunition to an eighteen-year-old buyer who used the ammunition to
284
commit suicide.
The appellate court reasoned that, despite the seller's
violation of the statute, the boy's suicide was "an independent, intervening cause
that insulate[d the seller] from [the] ... negligence per se claim" as a matter of
285
law. Given the troublesome teenage suicide rate, it seems that the legislature
would have contemplated such suicides by fireatms and would have intended to
protect minors as well as the general citizenry from the rash use of
286
firearms.
.

.

.

276. See id at 1224-25.
277. 773 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio 2002).
278. Id at 1021, 1032.
279. See id. at 1021.
280. Id at 1032.
281. Id. at 1041-43 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
282. 124 S.W.3d 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
283. Id. at 584-85.
284. ld. at 586.
285. !d. at 596.
286. The New York Times Almanac summarizes the pertinent national suicide statistics for
young people as follows:
Each year, approximately 30,000 Americans kill themselves about one person every 20
minutes .. . .
Suicide is the eleventh-leading cause of death of all Americans but the third-leading
cause for young people age 10-24. Depression, drug abuse, and a history of impulsive,
aggressive, or antisocial behavior appear to be associated with suicide in young
people....

THE TROUBLE WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE

2009]

263

The Washington intermediate appellate court, in Skeie v. Mercer Trucking
2 7
Co., Inc., s reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of a
trucking company that was sued by the passen er of a car that "crashed head-on
injured when "the trailer's load of cement blocks [came loose and] fell onto
289
The appellate court reasoned that the trucking company's statutory
him. "
failure to properly secure the load pursuant to a state statute constituted evidence
of negligence because the statute, as interpreted by the court, was intended to
·"protect[] all who travel on public roads against injury from improperly secured
loads that fall from vehicles[, and the car p~ssenger] was a member of the class
290
of people who travel[led] on public roads~" Other courts would have found the
trucking company's violation of the state safety statute to be negligence per
291
se.
On remand, the trial court judge in such a case would likely face the
vexing problem of instructing the jury on comparative negligence between the
trucking company's statutory failure to properly secure the load; the trucker's
negligence in causing the head-on collision; and the car driver's negligence in
causing the head-on collision.
In a confusing application of negligence per se principles, the Illinois
292
intermediate appellate court, in Putman v. Village of Bensenville, affirmed in
part the trial court's grant of a summary judgment to a municipality in a
negligence suit brought by a £edestrian who was rendered a quadriplegic in a fall
2 3
on a village sidewalk ramp. The appellate court turgidly reasoned that even if
the relevant provisions of the Illinois Accessibility Code established a negligence
per·se standard of care for the village in judging whether the ramp was safe, any
294
defect in the ramp was "de minimis.'' While a de minimis noncompliance with
a state safety statute arguably fits into the Restatement's "further excuses worthy
295
of recognition" verbiage, the court failed to explain adequately the basis and
application of its de minimis noncompliance rationale.

• • • •

The majority of Americans [in all age groups] who commit suicide shoot themselves
(55 p~rcent in 1999).
THE N.Y. TIMES, THE NEW YORK TIMES 2007 ALMANAC 385 (John W~ Wright ed., 2007).
287. 61 P.3d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
288. Id at 1208.
289. Id
290. ld at 1209.
291. See, e.g~, Fortner v. Tecchio Trucking, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757-58 (E.D. Tenn.
2009) (granting partial summary judgment to an injured accident victim on a negligence per se
claim where the defendant trucking company violated regulations requiring that trucks be loaded
securely).
292. 786 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
293. !d. at 204-05.
294. Id at 208.
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 15
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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decision by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Cook v.

liability enactment, noting that its reading was "similar but not identical to the"
97
trial court's view that the state's violation constituted negligence per se? The
Indiana intermediate court had offered yet a third take on the meaning of the dog
bite statute: the statute did not render the owner liable for negligence per se and
298
ordinary rules of common law negligence applied.
The Cook case is
illustrative of the wide-ranging and misguided discretion that judges enjoy in
divining the intent of the legislature's promulgation of a criminal enactment that
299
is nonprescriptive in its applicability to a tort action.
300
In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
liberally interpreted a Baltimore city housing code as creating negligence per se
liability for a city landlord in an action by a tenant who sued in negligence based
301
on the landlord's violation of lead-based paint prohibitions. The tenant's child
had been diagnosed with an elevated blood lead level, and evidence existed that
302
The
the child had consumed paint flakes and chips at the rented apartment.
litigation created a panoply of different judicial reactions to the local housing
code: the trial court ·e ntered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff
dama .es; the intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded for a new
constructive, the landlord ha[d] no duty" to remove lead paint prohibited by the
304
city housing code.
305
In the Alaska case of Getchell v. Lodge, the driver of a car braked to avoid
a moose and skidded on ice into ohcomin~ .traffic, violating traffic regulations
3 6
that required vehicles to stay on the right. The plaintiff brought a negli~ence
07
action to recover for personal injuries caused by the skidding defendant.
At
trial, the court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant and denied
plaintiffs motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial
308
The Supreme Court of Alaska
predicated on a negligence per se argument.
affirmed, holding that reasonable jurors could have concluded that the defendant
was excused from complying with the pertinent traffic regulations because the

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

796 N.E.2d 271 (Ind. 2003).
!d. at 276.
Id. at 274.
See UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.02, at 84-86.
835 A.2d 616 (Md. 2003).
Id at 618, 627.
Id at 617.
Id at 618.
Id at 632 (Raker, J., dissenting).
65 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Id at 52-53.
!d. at 52.
!d. at 52-53.
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309

While the result
presence of a moose in the road created an emergency.
appears to make pragmatic sense, it would seem that Alaska drivers should
foresee the possibility of moose intruding on their highways~ A fairer allocation
of the loss. would have been a recovery for the innocent plaintiffs injuries, bas.e d
on the clear-cut violation of the traffic regulations, reduced by a certain amount
for the ostensible emergency scenario. Arguably, the presence of a negligence
per se situation confused the jury and led them to make an either/or decision on
liability.
.
310
In Murphy v. State,
ambiguities in the Washington State Health Care
Disclosure Act led to a divergence of interpretation between the trial court judge
311
and the Washington intermediate appellate court. Murphy involved a county
sheriff and his family who "sued the State for damages . . . caused by the . . .
[s]tate [pharmacy [b]oard's negligent disclosure of [the sheriffs] prescription
who used the records in an unsuccessful criminal case against the plaintiff for
313
obtaining prescription drugs by deceit. The trial court entered judgment on the
jury verdict for the plaintiffs,. holding that the state pharmacy board had a
314
statutory duty to prevent disclosure of private health information.
The
intermediate appellate court, however, reversed in part and remanded, holding
that the trial court had erred in construing the Health Care Disclosure Act as
315
creating negligence per se liability.
Conceding that the legislature had
intended to "protect patient information from disclosure to the public,'' the
intermediate appellate court noted that the legislature also intended ''to allow law
316
enforcement access [to] enforc[e] prescription drug laws."

4.

2004

The vagaries of a state criminal vegetation maintenance statute figured into
Judicial confusion in the federal diversity case, Shanklin v. Norfolk Southern
317
Railway Co.
The widow of a car driver who was killed by a train while
crossing railroad tracks sued the railroad in a wrongful death action, alleging
negligence due to inadequate warning devices and deficient removal of
318
vegetation around the crossing area. The federal district court, after an initial

309. Id at 55.
62 P.3d 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
See id. at 536--37.
Id at 535.
!d. at 535-36.
ld. at 536-37, 542.
315. ld. at542.
316. Id.
317. 369 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
318. Id at 982.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
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remand, entered judgment on a jury verdict for the widow based on negli · ence
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
jury's consideration of Tennessee's vegetation and passenger safety statute did
20
not constitute reversible error? The appellate court's concurring opinion
argued that the state statute was relevant as evidence of negligence by the
railroad toward other classes of persons not specifically delineated in the
321
statute.
In a questionably narrow construction of a federal statute, a federal district
322
judge in Wallace v. United States
narrowed the plaintiffs' legal claims
involving exposure of the occupants of a home, purchased from the federal
323
government, to lead-based paint.
The homebuyer brought suit against the
federal government, a local housing authority, and a realtor, asserting
negligence, breach of contract, violations of state law, and negligence per se for
violations of the federal Residential Lead-Base Paint Hazard Reduction Act of
324
1992 (RLPHRA). All of the charges were predicated on the failure to warn the
homebuyer of lead-based paint in the house; which he purchased and
325
subsequently leased to his children and their mother.
Granting a partial
judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence per se claim with respect to the realtor, the
court found that while the realtor owed a duty to the homebuyer to disclose the
possible presence of lead paint, the realtor did not owe that same duty to the
children or their mother because, as mere tenants of the property, they fell
326
outside of the protective orbit of the RLPHRA.
327
The Washington dram shop case, Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.,
created a multiplicity of confusing judicial constructions of the criminal
provisions in the Alcoholic Beverages Control Act. An intoxicated driver, who
328
had been overserved alcohol by the defendant tavern, caused the accident. The
trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the tavern, and the Washington
329
intermediate appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Washington,
however, reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the statutory "'apparently under the influence"'
330
standard.
This. standard derived from the state criminal provisions of the
..

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

328.
329.
330.

!d. at982-83.
Id. at 992, 994.
ld. at 994-95 (Rogers, J., concurring).
335 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.R.I. 2004).
!d. at 254-55.
Id
Id at 255.
!d. at 263--66.
96 P.3d 386 (Wash. 2004).
Id at 387.
!d. at 389.
!d. at 393.
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Alcoholic Beverages Control Act and was "the minimum standard of conduct for
commercial hosts whose aile ed overservice cause[d] a drunk driving accident
obligate the court to apply the negligence per se statutory standard, which would
332
the other dissent
modify an already preexisting duty of alcohol providers,
countered that the statutory standard should be applied but that the plaintiff
motorist failed to establish reversible error or prejudice from the trial court's
333
improper jury instructions.
In the · erplexing New Mexico case, Spencer v. University of New Mexico
negligence law effect to be given to a problematic state statute that was
335
repealed. The estate of a patient, who received a fatal injection of heroin by an
in-home caregiver, sued the caregiver's employer for negligent hiring and
retention, alleging that the hospital failed to conduct a criminal back~round
33
check required by the state Caregivers Criminal History Screening Act. After
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the New
Mexico intermediate appellate court held that the statute, under the limited
circumstances of the case at bar, would not form the basis of a duty to conduct
337
The court made this
the prehire background check on the errant caregiver.
determination despite the fact that the statute was in force when the caregiver
338
was hired. It predicated its rationale on the questionable subsequent legislative
339
340
intent of a later state legislature, which had decided to repeal the old statute.
341
A Supreme Court of Connecticut case, Ward v. Greene, created splintered
appellate opinions with differing interpretations of a state statute requiring
reports of child abuse. The mother, individually and as administratrix of her
deceased child's estate, sued a private child-placement provider for negligence
per se in failing to notify a state agency of its suspicions that a dayca:re
employee, who allegedly shook the child to death, had previously abused several
342
foster children. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment based
.

.

.

331. Id
332. ld. at 400 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
333. ld at 405 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
334. 91 P.3d 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004), rev 'd sub nom. Spencer v. Health Force, Inc., 107 P.3d
504 (N.M. 2005).
335. ld. at 76-77.
336. ld. at 75-76.
337. Id. at 75, 77.
338. ld at 77.
339. Subsequent legislative history coming after a statute is passed by a legislature "is
highly disfavored for both rule of law and policy reasons." Wn..LIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIPP.
FRICKEY & ELIZABE1H GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 316 (2d ed.
2006).
340. See Spencer, 91 P.3d at 77-78.
341. 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 2004).
342. Id. at 1262, 1265-66.
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343

on the inapplicability of the state reporting statute.
The Supreme Court of
Connecticut affirmed, reasoning that the defendant's duty to report suspected
child abuse under the statute was not mandated for the protection of th-e deceased
child, who was not within the class of persons to whom the defendant owed a
344
duty.
A dissent, however, argued that the defendant's failure to report
allegations of abuse violated the statutory duty to all children in the care of the
345
suspected abuser.

5.

2005

A Supreme Court_ of Wyoming case, Landsiedel v. Buffalo Properties,
46
LLC/ illustrates the chaotic effect of building codes that are subject to
discretionary local adoption. The plaintiff, who was injured when he put his arm
through a plate glass window as he was leaving a bar, sued the bar owner,
alleging that it negligently failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe
347
condition.
The trial court entered a judgment on the jury verdict for the bar
348
owner.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed, holding that evidence
supported the verdict and that the trial court had not erred in refusing to instruct
the jury on the negligence per se effect of building codes because there was
conflicting evidence on the issue of whether the building codes, had been
349
adopted locally.
350
The Arizona intermediate appellate court, in Martin v. Schroeder,
a~firmed ~he trial court's rulin~ in favor of parents the .defen?ants who had
3 1
The appellate court's dtscusston can best be
gtven thetr adult son a gun.
understood as an equitable limit on the admittedly applicable negligence per se
standard imposed by a federal statute. Nine months after the parents gave a gun
to their adult son, the son accidentally shot his friend in the head while they were
352
smoking marijuana together.
The victim sued the shooter's parents for
negligent entrustment and negligence per se for violation of the Federal Gun
353
Control Act. Affirming the trial court's grant of a summary judgment for the
parents, th-e Arizona interme-diate appellate court agree-d that while the federal
statute supported a claim of negligence per se because its purpose was to
protect a class of persons who could be harmed by an unlawful drug user or

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

!d. at 1264.
Id at 1272-73.
Id at 1273-74 (Katz, J., dissenting).
112 P.3d 610 (Wyo. 2005).
Id at 612.

!d.
ld. at 617-18.
105 P.3d 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
ld. at 578.
I d. at 579.
See id at 579, 582 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006)).
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addict with a gun the victim's negligence per se claim failed, nevertheless,
because the plaintiff did not prove that, when the parents gave the son a gun,
"they knew or had reason to believe he was addicted to marijuana within the
354
meaning of the Act.'' A more convincing rationale for the result, however,
would be a lack of factual causation or proximate causation connecting the
parents' inadvertent violation of the statute and the victim's gunshot damages.
355
The Idaho case of 0 'Guin v. Bingham County involved the reversal by the
Supreme Court of Idaho of the trial court's grant of summary judgment for a
356
defendant county that owned a landfill where trespassing children were killed.
The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the· grant of summary judgment and
remanded for trial the parents' wrongful death action based on the county's
357
The supreme
negligence per se in violating landfill operating regulations.
·court held that the regulations violation constituted negligence per se and that the
common law willful-or~wanton standard of care for premises liability to
358
trespassers was inapposite.
359
In a Wyoming negligence per se case, Burnett v. Imerys Marble, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Wyoming rendered a doctrinally defensible analysis of the
inapplicability of the Mine Safety and Health Administration MSHA)
.

.

.

case, a trucking company employee fell off his truck as he was placing tarps over
361
a marble load he had picked up at a mine. The supreme court reasoned that
because the statute's purpose was to protect miners working in mines, a
commercial truck driver like the plaintiff, who occasionally transported products
produced in the mine, was not exposed to the types of mining hazards
contemplated in the legislation and, therefore, was not protected by the MSHA
362
or its regulations. However, a more pragmatic use of the mining statute and its
regulations might have been for the court to apply them to the injured trucker
363
given the special dangers posed by anyone who performs work for a mine.

354. ld. at 582-84.
355. 122 P.3d 308 (Idaho 2005).
356. ld. at 310.
357. Id. at 314--15.
358. Id at 314.
359. 116 P.3d 460 (Wyo. 2005).
360. See id at 462--64.
361. Id at 461.
362. I d. at 463-64.
363. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO
INDUSTRIES: MINING, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/oco/cg/cgs004.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2009) (discussing the dangerous work environments of various mines, quarries, and well sites for
miners, loading-machine operators, and truck drivers working therein); see also Mike Waterhouse,
Coal Truck Driver Killed at WV Mine, WSAZ, Aug~ 23, 2008, http://www.wsaz.com/news/
headlines/27313294.html (reporting the death of a truck driver from an accident on his "second day
working at a mine").
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2006

A multiple tractor-trailer accident involving violations of safety regulations
pertaining to commercial vehicle wheels created discomfiture for a Texas trial
364
court in Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres. The trial court entered judgment
365
on a jury verdict awarding damages to a driver injured in the wreck. The court
provided a negligence per se jury instruction predicated on a commercial vehicle
366
safety regulation violated when two wheels separated from a trucking rig. The
Texas intermedia!e apFellate court ~eversed. in part and ~emanded for. a n~w ~~al
3 7
on the cross-clatms.
It based tts holdtng on the tmproper strtct habthty
368
standard articulated by the trial court's negligence per sejury instructions. The
problem could have been avoided, according to the appellate court, by the trial
-c ourt's submission of an "excuse instruction ... permit[ting] the jury to consider
whether [the defendant trucking firm] knew or should have known" of safety
369
problems with the wheels.
·
370
In White v. Sabatino,
a federal district court judge in Hawaii faced an
unusual admiralty-based argument of a cruise ship owner in a suit by the
administrator of the estate of a motorist who was killed in an automobile
371
accident with an intoxicated driver who had attended a "snorkeling cruise."
The plaintiff claimed that the cruise ship owner's practice of serving "unlimited .
. . liquor for a fixed price during a set period of time" violated a county's liquor
372
ordinance.
The cruise ship owner unsuccessfully sought a limitation of
373
liability based on the vessel's value.
The court, in tum, granted partial
summary judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that th·e plaintiff could proceed
374
without limitation. The trial court concluded that the county liquor ordinance
established a negligence per se standard for the cruise ship owner and that there
was a reasonably close causal relation between the breach of the county
ordinance and the accident because the decedent was the type of victim the
ordinance was intended to protect from the type of accident the ordinance was
375
intended to prevent.
All in all, this approach to the negligence per se made
sense. The court was justified in ignoring the hypertechnical admiralty damages
limitation argument of the cruise ship owner. Furthermore, the court exhibited
.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

191 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App. 2006).
!d. at :835.
Id at 834, 838-39 (citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 393.205, 396.3, 396.13 (2005)).
Id at 852.
Id. at 841.
Id at 842.
415 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Haw. 2006).
ld. at 1167--68.
ld. at 1181.
Id. at 1181, 1186.
Id. at 1186.
Id at 1182-84.

.
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sense in accepting the county liquor control ordinance as a practical, specific
standard of care, notwithstanding the view by some other courts that a county's
legislative enactment should be viewed as less prestigious than a state or federal
376
statute.
Another practical and sensible judicial negligence per se decision was the
311
Arizona intermediate appellate court's reversal, in Gipson v. Kasey, of a trial
378
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Gipson was a wrongful
death action by a surviving parent of a drug-overdose victim against the victim's
379
co-worker. The surviving parent alleged that the coworker negligently caused
the victim's death by furn~shing prescri~ti?n ~ills to the vi~tim's girl~iend, who
80
subsequently gave the pills to the victim.
In reversing the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendant, the appellate court discerned a statute381
based duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the victim. The court
looked to the strong public policy behind several state and federal statutes that
outlawed distributing prescription drugs to those who had not been prescribed
382
the medications.
The opinion refreshingly departed from the traditional
negligence per se mechanistic tests, which seek to discern vague and often
nonexistent ~'legislative intent" to create a tort duty standard from a criminal or
383
regulatory enactment. Instead, it wisely focused on more realistic and coherent
384
public policy considerations.
In a mechanistic and stilted negligence per se ruling, the North Carolina
85
intermediate appellate court, in Hall v. Toreros, II, Inc. /
shunned polic ·
In Hall, victims of an automobile collision caused by an intoxicated driver
brought a negligence suit against a restaurant that had served alcoholic beverages
387
to a customer who later drove away from the restaurant.
The trial court
granted the restaurant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after

376. See, e.g., Schumer v. Caplin, 150 N.E. 139, 140 (N.Y. 1925) ("The violation of a statute
under certain circumstances may of itself establish negligence. Not so, however, with a rule or
ordinance.").
377. 129 P.3d 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006), vacated in part by 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz. 2007).
378. Id at 959.
379. !d. at 960.
380. !d. at 959-60.
381. Id. at 962-63.
382. ld.
383. See Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he
touchstone . . . is the presence of an expression of legislative intent specifically to create such a
right, and the form and language of the rule are the primary indicators of such an expression."
(alteration in original) (quoting Kranzusb v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 268
(Wis. 1981))).
384. Gipson, 129 P.3d at 963.
385. 626 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. Ct. App~ 2006).
386. See id. at 869.
387. !d. at 863.
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the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. In affirming, the North Carolina
intermediate appellate court held that the trial court was correct in rejecting the
plaintiffs' argument that a state Alcoholic Beverage- Control Commission
regulation imposed a legal duty on the restaurant to prevent the driver from
389
consuming alcohol on its premises after it knew that he was intoxicated. The
appellate court went on to note that the statutory scheme, under which the
administrative regulation was promulgated, did not contain any express language
390
·
regarding consumption ofalcohol by intoxicated persons.
IV. FROM READING LEGISLATIVE TEA LEAVES
OF INTENT
TO ASTUTE JUDICIAL
.
.
POLICY ANALYSIS

Negligence per se analysis judicial efforts to interpret the nonprescriptive
commands of an authoritative legislative body or administrative agency in an
effort to determine whether a tort jury should have its common law role of
applying a broad standard of reasonable care under the circumstances trumped
by a more specific standard of care suffers from both general form and
function problems and specific form and function problems.
The discussion that follows first considers the general form and function
problems of judicial negligence per se analysis. Then it reviews a host of specific
391
form and function issues of judicial negligence per se analysis.

A. An Overview ofNegligence Per Se Form and Function Problems
Negligence per se analysis in American judicial opinions emerged from the
392
first mention ofthe phrase "negligence per se" in an 1841 judicial opinion, to
twenty-first century cases applying_ methodologies of legislative intent and
393
purpose. In terms of legal theory, this negligence per se analysis is a general
type of functional legal form involving a methodological type and an interpretive
subtype, with implications for institutional, preceptual, and enforcement or
394
implementive types of legal form.
Part IV.B first delineates and amplifies
these general form and function terms, which were previously articulated by
Professor Robert S. Summers. It describes American judicial negligence per se
analysis in terms of Summer's form and function typology. Part IV.C and Part
.

.

388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 864.
Id at 867-70.
!d. at 869.
I am particularly indebted to the excellent theoretical book, ROBERTS. SU1viMERS, FORM

AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM (2006).

392. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
393. See supra Part III. C.
394. See infra Part IV.B.
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IV.D then analyze general and specific legal form and function problems of the
negligence per se doctrine.
B. An Introduction to Legal Form and Function Theory
Summers explained that "[t]he overall forms of functional legal units" in a
modern legal system "stand as tributes to the organizational inventiveness of
developed Western societies. The realization of humanistic values, including
justi~e, order, liberty, de~o~racy, _rationali~, the rule of law, and m?~e, has been
95
heavily dependent on this Inventiveness." Yet, somewhat surprisingly, legal
forms "purposive systematic arrangements" of a legal system "have seldom
in the course of Western legal theory been explicitly conceived as objects of
frontal and systematic theoretical inquiry,'' and consequently, this disorderly
theoretical tendency has impeded the full "understanding of the nature of
functional legal units or as contributing to the efficacy of such units as means to
396
ends."
Summers noted that "purported 'law' may be so deficient in form as to be
profoundly dysfunctional, and thus be at best a highly degenerate specimen of
law, and, if deficient enough, not law at all, even though officially 'laid
397
down.'" He explained that "[r]eason should permeate and shape the purposive
design of overall form, its constituent features, and the complementa material
duly designed forms, even the fotentially most proficient of such components
39
could avail us relatively little. "
Summers set forth five general types of "overall forms of functional legal
40
401
units." ° First, "a functional legal unit may be institutional in nature."
Institutional types include legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, and
402
corporate and other private entities.
Second, "a functional legal unit may
403
be ... preceptua/."
Preceptual types include rules, principles, maxims, and
404
405
general orders. Third, "a functional legal unit may be ... methodologica/."

395. Sillv1MERS, supra note 391, at 7.
396. !d.
397. Id. at 34. "For example, the expressional feature of the overall form of an enacted
statutory rule otherwise in due form may be such that what the rule means is quite unclear to all of
its addressees! [In Professor Summers's] view, such a 'rule' would fail to qualify as law at all." Id.
398. Id at 35.
399. Id
400. Id at 54.
401. Id at 37 (emphasis added).
402. Id. at 54.
403. Id at 37 (emphasis added).
404. !d. at 54.
405. !d. at 37 (emphasis added).
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Methodological types include interpretation, drafting, and fact-finding. Fourth,
407
"a functional legal unit may be ... enforcive." Enforcive legal units include
408
sanctions, remedies, and others. Finally, "a functional legal unit may be ... a
409
nonpreceptual species of law."
Nonpreceptual types include contracts,
410
However, the schematic by Summers is not
property interests, and wills.
. . 411
exhausttve.
Summers went on to explain that "[t]he ... forms of functional legal units
within Western legal systems vary in their approximations to what may be ideal.
412
Yet these forms define and organize the [legal] units to serve purposes."
Indeed, he noted that "[w]hen the purposes to be served are valuable, and these
forms and their complementary material ... are sufficiently well-designed, then
413
some value will ordinarily be realized when the units are duly put to use."
Finally, with regard to the interpretive subtype of the methodological type of
overall forms of functional legal units what may be viewed as the key
functional legal unit in negligence per se analysis "[t]he purposes ofthe overall
form ... of a methodology for interpreting statutes include objective, reasoned,
and
purpose-fulfilling
faithful,
consistent,
predictable,
efficient,
414
interpretation." Moreover, ''[i]t is also a systematic means to the realization of
415
more ultimate purposes such as democracy, legitimacy, and the rule of law."
Judges and lawyers must understand "[t]he primary criterion of interpretive
416
Professor
faithfulness" in fashioning arguments for statutory interpretation.
Summers has identified at least five candidates as the primary criterion of
statutory faithfulness:

(1) [T]he interpretation that confonns most closely to the relevant
standard ordinary, or relevant standard technical, or relevant special,
meaning of the language adopted in the statute, in light of immediate
purposes of the statute evident from text and context (languageoriented), or
(2) the interpretation that best accords with reliable evidence of the
applicational intentions of individual legislators, or of major committees

!d.
Id.
ld.
ld.
410. Id
411. Id
406.
407.
408.
409.

at 54.
at 38 (emphasis added).
at 54.
at 37 (emphasis added).
at 54.
For example, the jury would be another illustrative institutional type of functional

legal unit.

412. Id at 38.
413. Id.
414. Id at 242.
415. !d.
416. !d. at 255.
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of legislators, or of sponsoring legislators speaking on the floor of the
legislature, etc. (intent-oriented), or
.

.

(3) the interpretation that best implements the ultjmate general purpose
or purposes justifiably attributable to the legislature in adopting the
statute, (ultimate purpose-oriented), or
(4) the interpretation that best implements a policy judges themselves
wish to implement, believe the legislature may have espoused, and
believe to be achievable in the circumstances, (policy-oriented), or
(5) some other criterion.

417

C. General Form and Function Problems of the Negligence Per Se
Doctrine
There are six overarching general form and function problems with
traditional negligence per se analysis.
First, as a major, functional legal unit involving an interpretational
methodology for judges to decide whether a nonprescriptive statutory or
administrative standard should constitute, as a matter of law, a specific standard
of conduct in a tort action (typically of negligence), the methodology, while
inventive and motivated by the democratic ~'rule of law" values to apply criminal
and administrative standards of care implicitly sanctioned by a legislative body
or agency, is seriously flawed by what may be termed a fundamental origin
problem. As demonstrated in the initial portions of this Article, nineteenth
century American judges started to utilize negligence per se parlance as a
shorthand way of describing certain types of conduct as negligent as a matter of
418
law.
This approach was closely related to so-called rule of law assessments
made by judges in an "attempt to create specific rules of conduct that
419
they ... declare to be the rule the reasonable person will always follow." This
disorqerly genesis confused negligence per se analysis as it later developed that
is, when courts began creating tort actions from nonprescriptive legislative

417. Id. (emphasis added). Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett espouse a "pragmatic theory" of
statutory interpretation, which consists of a "web of beliefs" that views "human decisionmaking'.' as
"polycentric, spiral, and inductive, not unidimensional, linear, and deductive," and assert that under
this approach, ''the most concrete considerations," like "statutory text" and "specific legislative
intent," outweigh more abstract ones, like "imaginative reconstruction," "legislative purpose,"
"evolution of [the] statute," and "current values." ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339,
at 249-50. Their model suggests an interactive process of statutory interpretation that considers
these factors, "considering the strengths of various considerations, rethinking each in light of the
others, and weighing ~em against one another" in the process of interpretation. Id at 250.
418. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
419. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 132, at 309.
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420

This has left dangling, so to speak, vital
criminal or administrative rules.
issues of means and ends instead of fashioning a theoretically sound purposive,
systematic arrangement in tort law.
Second, negligence per se analysis as an interpretational methodology was
not duly and purposively designed, and therefore, it suffers an unreasoned
haphazardness problem. Indeed, negligence per se analysis "grew up without
careful explicit consideration" of ends and means and "[c]ommentators dreamed
up [various] fanciful explanations for the" methodology and rule of liability for
421
breaching a nonprescriptive legislative or administrative standard.
"One
argument was that the legislature intended to provide for tort liabili£' but forgot
42
to do so. Another was that reasonable people always obey statutes."
Third, negligence per se analysis, similar to the methodology of judge-made
rules of law in negligence cases, is often rigid and overinclusive, forbidding or
limiting the jury's "assessment of the evidence to determine whether [a civil
litigant] was negligent in the particular circumstances" suggested by the
423
evidence. While specific excuses have been incorporated into negligence per
se jurisprudence by various iterations of the American Law Institute's
424
Restatement of Torts,
the analytical gestalt of negligence per se is,
nevertheless, characterized by a nonjlexibility problem.
Fourth, negligence per se analysis suffers from an institutional legitimacy
problem. Courts employing negligence per se principles do not generally claim
that the pertinent legislature or administrative agency intended to imply a tort
425
cause of action. Yet courts, concomitantly, are not candid in describing what
they are doing as judicial creation of tort law standards that restrict the baseline
freedom and flexibility of a jury to consider the question of reasonableness.

420. See supra notes 32-126 and accompanying text. A chronic unsystematic American
approach to ordering and interpreting statutes exacerbates the disorderly genesis of negligence per
se analysis. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods
and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 545 (2006) (noting that three factors coalesce to
create indeterminate American statutory law: "lack of system in ordering and interpreting statutes;
assimilation of statutes to common law resulting in the undermining [ofj the reliability of statutes as
authoritative rules; and encouragement of lawyers to develop novel legal theories").
421. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 319.
422. ld.
423. ld. § 132, at 310 (discussing rigidity and overinclusiveness of judge-made rules of law in
negligence cases like "stop, look, and listen'' railroad crossing cases).
424. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 288A (1965) (enumerating excuses for
various situations in which violating a statute is otherwise reasonable); RESTATE:rvtENT OF TORTS
§ 286 cmt. c (1934) (discussing situations like emergencies where "the circumstances justify an
apparent disobedience to the letter ofthe enactment").
425. See, e.g., White v. Sabatino, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1182-84 (D. Haw~ 2006) (relying on
its O\Vll conclusion that the victim was the type of victim the ordinance was intended to protect and
that the accident was the type of accident the ordinance was intended to prevent).
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Fifth, the effect of a negligence per se ruling in a case creates confusion and
complexity for a trial court and a jury resulting in a dysfunctional preceptual
problem~

Finally, negligence per se can lead to disproportionate liability for litigants
426
who breach nonprescriptive criminal-based statutory or administrative rules.
This is best described as a dysfunctional enforcement or implementive problem.

FIGURE 1
Summary of General Form and
Function Problems with Negligence Per Se
Problem

Nature ofProblem

1~ Fundamental Origin

•

2. Unreasoned Haphazardness

,•

•
•

3. Nonflexibility

•

,•

The historical basis of the
doctrine is hard to trace.
The judiciary did not duly and
purposively design the
doctrine.
There is a lack of an adequate
means and ends analysis.
The judicial explanations for
the doctrine are dubious.
The doctrine's rigid and
overinclusive approach is
similar to "rule of law"
negligence.
The doctrine restricts the
jury's full, contextualized
assessment of all the evidence
bearing on facts of negligent
conduct.

426. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90.
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4. Institutional Legitimacy

•

•

5. Dysfunctional Preceptual

•

6. Dysfunctional Enforcement or

•

Implementive
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There is a lack of judicial
candor regarding judicial
creation of tort law standards
while restricting jury's role.
Some courts errantly claim
that they are bound by
legislative intent in the face of
a textually nonprescriptive
criminal or administrative
enactment that says nothing
about tort law.
There is excessiv,e confusion
among trial courts, judges,
andjuries in understanding
and applying the doctrine in
concrete cases.
Disproportionate liability
exists for tort damages.

D. Specific Form and Function Problems of the Negligence Per Se
Doctrine
On a more detailed level, there are numerous specific form and function
problems with the negligence per se doctrine.
First, "[t]hough well-settled [for over a century], there is certainly room to
question the propriety of placing so much weight on laws that were enacted
27
without any indication of an intent to affect negligence law.',4 Moreover,
statutory text provides absolutely no language-oriented criterion for concrete,
"objective, reasoned, faithful, consistent, predictable, efficient, and purpose428
of nonprescriptive statutes and
fulfilling [judicial] interpretation''
administrative regulations. By virtue of the negligence per se doctrine, relatively
abstract considerations of legislative purpose ungrounded, by definition, in
either concrete statutory text or concrete specific legislative intent are
ritualistically invoked by judges in a highly manipulable process that leads to
divergent and unpredictable results.
Second, an important specific "criticism arises from the widely divergent
impact the violation of a criminal statute has in a criminal prosecution from that
429
in a tort case." One commentator described the problem as follows:

427. ld.
428. SIDAI\1ERS, supra note 391, at 242.
429. UNDERSTANDING TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 202, § 6.07, at 100.
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Violation of most of the criminal statutes used in negligence per se cases
leads to the imposition of a modest fine in the criminal context. Because
of the slight penalty and the enormous administrative burden required
by considering all possible defenses, these offenses are often strict
liability in nature, thus disposing of the State's requirement to show a
bad intent. In the negligence per se context, however, the impact of
violation can be enormous as the defendant is liable for all the harm
proximately caused by the statutory violation. Further, this result can be
achieved without pro;idin~ th~ s?rt of safeSuards (such as an elevated
0
burden of proof) provtded t.n crtmtnal cases.
Third, given that most American jurisdictions have come to allow judicial
consideration of "broad excuses" for statutory and administrative violations of a
431
nonprescriptive enacted standard in the context of tort cases,
it is highly
questionable why courts allow precious judicial resources to be consumed in a
remarkably inefficient process of considering potential nonprescriptive standards
432
and far ranging, unlimited excuses.
Fourth, the very conceptual foundation of the rationale for the negligence
per se doctrine "the doctrine's ability to provide greater certainty than the usual
reasonable person standard" is undermined by the broad and far ranging
excuses that may be considered as reasons for why a tort litigant violated a
433
particular nonprescriptive standard.
·
Fifth, ''the negligence per se doctrine greatly constricts the jury's traditional
role of determining breach [of a duty of care] and often invests the trial judge
with broad discretion. To the extent that judge-made [rule of law] standards of
care have been rejected," it is anomalous for judges to have "wide discretion to
434
impose legislative standards" under negligence per se principles.
Sixth, the doctrine of negligence per se constitutes an inappropriate, and
arguably radical, "encroachment upon the . . . legislature" and duly constituted

430. ld. at 100-01 (emphasis omitted).
431. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90 n.18.
432. Perhaps a key motivation for the attraction of negligence per se analysis is the elusive
desire of judges to control their busy dockets and to simplify the resolution of disputes. In this
regard, see LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 148-52 (1930). Green viewed the then-nascent
negligence per se doctrine in American tort cases as a simplifying judicial device akin to the way
that courts had attempted to simplify judicial resolution of cases involving damages from wild
animals, abnormally dangerous activities, slander per se rules, and libel per se rules.ld at 148-50.
Yet, Green recognized the efficacy problem of negligence per se escape hatches (like contributory
negligence and proximate causation) that made negligence per se analysis inefficient and time
consuming.Jd at 150.
433. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90 n.l8.
434. ld at 90 (emphasis omitted); cf. GREEN, supra note 432, at 166 e'Nothing is more
obvious from a reading of the cases than that courts desire to pass the negligence issue to the jury as
free from any commitments as possible and yet subjecting the jury to as much control as possible.").
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administrative agencies that have been delegated power to administratively
435
"If the legislature elects to do so, it surely may
govern social problems.
436
"When it does not
impose civil liability'' expressly by statutory enactment.
.elect to do so," it is hubristic and intrusive for a court to "presume'' a legislative
purpose based on abstract and undisciplined "readings'' of eneralized
.

.

FIGURE2
Summary of Specific Form and
Function Problems with Negligence Per Se
Problem

Nature ofProblem

1. Highly Manipulable

•

2. Import of Criminal Law Standards
Without Criminal Law Protections for
Defendants

•

3. Uncabined Excuses

•

Courts can pick and choose
assorted vague and
unpersuasive indicia of
legislative intent
notwithstanding.
nonprescriptive text and
nonexistent legislative historv.
Tort defendants are held
accountable for proximately
caused civil damages without
plaintiffs bearing heightened
burden of proof requirements
when using a quasi-criminal
or administrative enactment.
The doctrine creates confusion
and inefficiencies for trial
courts and juries with high
administrative costs.
The potentially numerous and
hard to apply excuses
undermine the so-called
greater certainty of the
doctrine.
The doctrine displaces the
·ury's traditional role in
. .

4. Self-Defeating

•

5. Excessive Judicial Discretion

•

.

435. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90.

436. ld.
437. ld.
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6. Judicial Encroachment on Legislature

E.

•

281

assessing fault in tort cases
with "udicial officiousness.
It is hubristic and intrusive for
the judiciary to presume
a
legislative purpose based on
abstract and undisciplined
readings of legislative intent
regarding a nonprescriptive
enactment.

Toward a Systematic Negligence Per Se Approach Involving Astute
Judicial Policy Analysis

A magical, one-size-fits-all approach will not resolve the trouble with
negligence per se. However, American courts could improve the judicial
decision "for determining when to adopt and when to reject a nonprescriptive
438
statute" or administrative regulation by following a few basic principles.
First and foremost, courts of last resort should candidly urge legislatures and
administrative agencies to set forth, in the enacted text of a police regulation,
whether the enactment should be used in tort actions and whether the enacted
standard (if expressly applicable to tort) is subject to any excuses for compliance
and the specific substance of those excuses. In this regard, legislatures and
administrative bodies (and their counsel) should strive to upgrade the craft of
drafting statutes and regulations so that uniform and consistent language is
routinely inserted into new police enactments on the prescriptiveness or
nonapplicability of the enactment in tort actions. A text-based approach to
modifying (or not modifying) the baseline common law standard of the
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances would obviate many of the
deficiencies of intent-based negligence per se analysis. As pointed out by Wilson
Huhn, "areas of common law are shrinking relative to text-bound law. As society
becomes more complex, legislatures have enacted detailed statutes_ and
comprehensive c~?es to bring uniformity and consistency to areas formerly
4 9
governed by dectstonal law." And yet, we cannot expect a better and more
systematic legislative process to solve the negligence per se conundrum in every,
or perhaps in most, situations. "Rather, the legislative process is an often-chaotic
process of lobbying by interest groups and of assessments by legislators of the
public interest and of their own, sometimes less public-regarding needs (such as

438. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 32L I attempt to address the challenge set forth by
Professor Dobbs to advance "systematic principles" in this vexing area. See id.
439. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 18 (2002).
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reelection)." An extreme view of the disorderliness of the legislative process is
that it consists of "merely the operation of politics conducted in an environment
441
virtually bereft of principled behavior." But, legislators are capable of taking
442
their lawmaking functions seriously and crafting the words that they enact into
443
textual public commands in a careful manner.
Second, in the absence of a clear-cut prescriptive legislative or
administrative rule establishing a srecific standard of care in a tort suit, courts
4
45
should prefer the tradition-baser! . and precedent-basecf ordinary prudent
person under the circumstances standard as discerned and applied by a common
law jury (with the possibility that a violation of a nonprescriptive enactment
could be considered by the jury as evidence of negligence). The venerable
reasonably prudent person standard has stood the test of time for nearly two
446
centuries of the Anglo-American experience. Moreover, courts of last resort

440. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339, at 3.
441. !d.
442. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process
Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895, 897-927 (2005) (outlining theoretical
attributes of a good American legislator).
443. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Legislation, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEO. L.J. 2185,
2204--06 (1996) (emphasizing the difficulty of legislative decision making to justify the respect that
the legislature deserves); Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity ofLegislation, 54 MD. L. REv. 633, 653-54
(1995) (arguing that careful attention to statutory text by legislators should be required by the very
nature of a legislative body as "a large gathering of disparate individuals who purport to act
collectively in the name of the whole community, but who can never be sure exactly what it is that
they have settled on, as a collective body, except by reference to a given form of words in front of
them").
444. "Tradition ... exerts a silent influence on legal reasoning. Our traditions establish
'baselines,' which are background assumptions that favor the status quo and place the burden of
proof on any person who seeks to change the existing order." HilliN, supra note 439, at 49.
445. "The principle of stare decisis (which literally means 'to stand by things decided') is
what lends strength to precedent. Stare decisis encourages courts to follow their own prior
decisions, and it requires lower courts to follow decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction."
ld at 42 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999)).
446. See generally DOBBS, supra note 2, §§ 117-118, at 277-81 (describing the objective
reasonable person standard). The objective reasonable person standard goes back at least to
Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P.). This proposal for using the objective
reasonable prudent standard as a baseline in the face of nonprescriptive statutory and administrative
police commands would not affect other areas of negligence law where "[t]he default standard of
reasonable care yields to the law's lesser standard for children, for instance, and in medical
malpractice cases the standard yields to the standard implicity undertaken by the physician and
based upon the custom of the medical community" or, by way of another traditional example, where
courts "may requjre of landowners very little care toward [adult] trespassers." DOBBS, supra note 2,
§ 117, at 277; see also Bauman v. Crawford, 704 P.2d 1181, 1187-89 (Wash. 1985) (Brachtenbach,
J ., concurring) (urging the reexamination of "the entire theory of negligence per se arising from the
alleged violation of a statute, an ordinance or an administrative regulation''). In Bauman, the
concurrence pointed out several practical problems with the doctrine of negligence per se and urged,
in the State of Washington, "prospectively limit[ing] the doctrine to an evidence of negligence
standard'' because, among other problems~ the negligence per se doctrine "removes the
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could provide proper separation of powers incentives to legislatures and
administrative agencies in their respective jurisdictions by announcing a clear
statement rule of interpretation that legislative bodies, including local bodies and
administrative agencies, under the jurisdiction of the court of last resort, may
create specific negligence per se standards of care in tort cases only by making
their intention unmistakably clear in the textual language of the standard,
447
ordinance, or administrative regulation.
Third, courts of last resort should reserve the judicial power to borrow
selectively and rarely nonprescriptive statutory and administrative standards to
modify the default objective reasonable person standard in civil tort suits.
48
However, the basis for this borrowing should not be intent-basecf arguments,
which are usually inefficacious in negligence per se jurisprudence, but on astute
449
policy analysis.
Furthermore, judicial policy-based borrowing in this regard
should be extraordinarily rigorous and based on well briefed policy analyses by
counsel. Unless compelling legislative facts brought to a court's attention or
subject to judicial notice provide a strong factual prediction that borrowing a
nonprescriptive legislative or administrative standard will, on balance;
substantially improve the use of the objective ordinary prudent person standard,
courts of last resort should refuse to borrow the nonprescriptive standards.

determination of negligence from the fact-fmding function of the jury, or the [trial] court sitting as a
fact fmder.'' Bauman, 704 P.2d at 1187-89 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
447. Clear statement rules of statutory interpretation have been employed by the Supreme
Court of the United States for the purpose of protecting federalism issues under the U.S.
Constitution. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339, at 367-75. By analogy, a clear
statement rule for a legislative or administrative creation of a specific tort standard of care would
protect institutional prerogatives of the judiciary and the jury to adjudicate tort suits using the
traditional negligence standard absent a clear indication from the legislature or executive branches
of government, within their constitutional powers, to alter those traditional prerogatives. See
UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90.
448. Intent-based arguments in law are based on numerous materials that are often vague and
abstract. Statutory and administrative intent is often divined by textual hints, previous versions of
the text, specific sequences of events leading up to an enactment, reports of legislative committees,
other government reports, and other miscellaneous commentaries. See HUHN, supra note 439, at 3143.
449. Professor Huhn explains:
There is a fundamental difference between policy arguments and the other four
types of legal argument. The distinctive feature of policy arguments is that they are
consequentialist in nature. The other four types of argument are appeals to authority, but
the core of a policy argument is that a certain interpretation of the law will bring about a
certain state of affairs, and this state of affairs is either acceptable or unacceptable in the
eyes of the law. Deriving rules of law from text, intent, precedent and tradition is
inherently conventional; such rules represent specific choices that our lawgivers have
already made. Deriving rules from policy arguments, on the other hand, is inherently
open-ended; the specific choice has not yet been made. Text, intent, precedent and
tradition look principally to the past for guidance; policy arguments look to the future for
confmnation.
Jd. at 51.
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Possible judicial policy considerations in making this determination might
include the following: (1) "the limits to implementation, administration, and
450
control"
that counsel in favor of modest and restrained judicial
experimentation in tinkering with the basic negligence standard, which would
allow the jury to consider nonprescriptive statutory and regulatory violations and
451
justifications for those violations; (2) the likely consequences of borrowing a
nonprescriptive statutory or administrative standard to the proper functioning of
a civil tort system involving lay juries and busy generalist trial court judges; (3)
the prospects of the legislature's seasonably amending a nonprescriptive statute
to encompass a prescriptive tort standard in future cases after judicial
hi~h~ighting of the nonp~es~riptive police standard in ~he ~ourse of ~n aFEellate
2
optnton and communtcattng the matter to legtslattve offictals;
(4)
"benchmarking" the prevalence of specific safety standards in particular areas of
tort law for example, industrial electrical wiring and grounding, operation of
453
heavy trucks, and commercial building construction; (5) the judicial opinions
of trial court judges and intermediate appellate court judges on the advisability of
a baseline reasonable person standard versus more specific standards of care in
certain kinds of tort suits where those specific standards are ensconced in
454
nonprescriptive policy or regulatory enactments; and (6) economic analyses
such as cost-benefit review, which is "the most straightforward attempt to

450. Robert E. Goodin et al., The Public and Its Policies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter PuBLIC POLICY] (citing
CHRISTOPHER C. HOOD, THE LIMITS OF ADl'viiNISTRATION (1976); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN &
AARON WILDAVSKY, lNIPLEMENTATION (1973); HERMAN R. VAN GUNSTEREN, THE QUEST FOR
CONTROL (1976)).
.
451. See generally id. at 6 ("Policy studies embody a bias toward acts, outputs, and
outcomes a concern with consequences that contrasts with the formal-institutional orientation of
.

much of the rest of political studies.'').
452. Cf id at 11-12 (discussing "networked governance" and asserting that "[b]road
cooperation from a great many effectively independent actors is required in order for any of them to
accomplish their goals'').
453. Cj id at 19 ("In the first instance, there is merely a process of collecting information on
policy performance ... on some systematic, comparable basis. But once that has been done, the
performance of better-performing states will almost automatically come to serve as a 'benchmark'
for the others to aspire to voluntarily initially, but with increasing amounts of informal and fonn.al
pressure as time goes by." (citing TONY ATKINSON ET AL., SOCIAL INDICATORS: THE EU AND
SOCIAL INCLUSION (2002); Claus Offe, The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It
Survive European Integration?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 437 (2003))).
454. Cj Richard Freeman, Learning in Public Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 450, at
367-88 (discussing the improvement of public policy decision making overtime through the process
of thinking about and resolving public policy problems); Goodin et al., supra note 450, at 19
("Policy, like all human action, is undertaken partly in ignorance; and to a large extent is a matter of
'learning-by-doing.''' (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,
29 REv. ECON. STUD. 155, 155 (1962); Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why
Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable, 31 WORLD POL. 61, 61-62 (1978))).
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measure the economic efficiency of policy altematives"
and which would
entail continuing with the general tort default standard of reasonable care under
the circumstances or borrowing more specific nonprescriptive statutory and
administrative standards for specific kinds of tort cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Negligence per se analysis is built on weak foundations. In the early
nineteenth century, courts started to use "negligence per se" parlance to talk
about conduct that was, or should be, negligent as a matter of law. As the
nineteenth century ripened and ultimately transitioned to the twentieth century,
courts and commentators parroted various unexamined assumptions for why a
nonprescriptive policy or regulatory standard should or should not be utilized in
a tort action. Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the Court Appeals for New York in a
famous 1920 opinion, proclaimed, with Platonic certitude, that the unexcused
456
violation of a nonprescriptive statutory enactment was negligence per se, an
essentialist judicial approach that contradicted an influential treatise that he
published in 1921 about the theory of judging. American courts have expended
considerable time and effort along with the time and effort of countless
lawyers and jurors in trying to conceptualize, analyze, understand, and apply
cumbersome and unwieldy negligence per se doctrine. In large measure, the
negligence per se doctrine has created a cottage judicial industry of reading
legislative tea leaves. This is a misconceived enterprise to discern legislative
intent to allow, or disallow, a nonprescriptive statutory standard that fails to
specify in the text of the enactment that it governs tort suits to be used in place
of, or along with, the traditional ordinary prudent person standard of care under
the circumstances.
Negligence per se doctrine suffers from assorted general form and function
problems which consist of a fundamental origin problem, an unreasoned
haphazardness problem, a nonflexibility problem, an institutional legitimacy
problem, a dysfunctional preceptual problem, and a dysfunctional enforcement
or implementive problem. Moreover, numerous specific form and function
problems hobble the negligence per se doctrine. One such problem is the
prevalence of broad and far ranging excuses that serve to vitiate the purpose of
the doctrine and lead to inefficient uses of judicial and legal resources. Another
is the unfair impact that can occur in utilizing nonprescriptive, quasi-criminal
violations that require a violator to pay exorbitant tort damages for all harm
proximately caused by the statutory violation.
It is high time for courts of last resort to move away from the problematic
intent-based approach of the negligence per se doctrine and to an astute judicial
.
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policy analysis approach for harmonizing nonprescriptive legislative and
administrative standards with the common law negligence standard. Courts
should follow three overarching principles in moving toward a systematic
negligence per se approach involving astute policy analysis not questionable
intent-based nostrums. First, courts of last resort should candidly insert guidance
language in their tort opinions urging legislative bodies and administrative
agencies within the pertinent jurisdiction to set forth whether or not an enactment
should be used in tort actions and what, if any, excuses should be cognizable.
Second, in the absence of a clear-cut prescriptive or administrative rule
establishing a specific standard of care in a tort suit, courts should prefer the
tradition-based and precedent-based ordinary prudent person under the
circumstances standard as discerned and applied by a common law jury. As part
of this principle, courts of last resort should announce a clear rule of
interpretation that would provide for a baseline traditional negligence standard
unless the relevant legislative or administrative body made it unmistakably clear
that it was enacting a more specific prescriptive standard. Third, courts of last
resort should reserve the judicial power to selectively and rarely borrow
nonprescriptive statutory and administrative standards to modify the default
objective reasonable person standard based on astute policy analysis of the likely
consequences, costs, and benefits of doing so in select cases.

